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2000 MOOT COURT COMPETITION
BENCH MEMORANDUM
WHETHER THE INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY THE DEFENDANT INVADED THE PLAINTIFF'S PRIVACY AS DEFINED
BY THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS GOVERNING
PUPBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS AND WHETHER
DEFENDANT'S USE OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY TO GATHER
THE INFORMATION DISPLAYED ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF
CONSTITUTED AN INVASION OF HER PRIVACY.

by ROBERT S. GURWIN AND NICOLE D. MILOSt

Edna Arbeiter,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 2000-135
EmployExpert.com,

)

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from the Order of the First District Court of Appeals, affirming the Madison County Circuit Court decision granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant EmployExpert.com in case
number 2000-CV-2365. 1
In finding for defendant, the lower courts held that information
about the plaintiff, displayed in a profile on defendant's Web site, was
t Robert S. Gurwin, Attorney at Law, LL.M in Information Technology, 2001, The
John Marshall Law School; J.D., 1992, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.A., 1989, The University of Michigan; Nicole D. Milos, B.S., 1998 Saint Mary's College;
J.D., The John Marshall Law School.
1. R. at 2.
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not private. 2 Additionally, the courts below held that the use of cookie
technology to gather this information was not, in and of itself, an inva3
sion of plaintiffs privacy.
Two issues have been raised on appeal. First, whether the information disseminated by the defendant invaded the plaintiffs privacy as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts governing public disclosure of
private facts. 4 Applicable law in the State of Marshall mirrors the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 5 In addition, this court must consider, on
appeal, whether defendant's use of cookie technology to gather the information displayed about the plaintiff constituted an invasion of her
6
privacy.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Neither party disputes the following facts. EmployExpert.com is a
commercial Web site offering consumers assistance with various employment matters. 7 More specifically, EmployExpert.com answers questions
submitted by its users who are searching for jobs and preparing for interviews.8 In addition, the Web site facilitates the online presentation of its
users' resumes. 9 By registering with EmployExpert.com, users submit
information to create a "profile." 10 The submitted information is
presented as a resume but with personal identifying information, such as
the person's name, address, and telephone number, redacted. 1 In addition, EmployExpert.com redacts the locations of its users' past employment and other information that might identify a user. 12 Upon
completing the registration process, EmployExpert.com assigns each
13
user profile an ID code number that is used as a reference locator.
EmployExpert.com provides the described services without charge to
its users. 14 EmployExpert.com receives its revenue from the firms that
place banner advertisements shown as visitors review the directory of
15
completed profiles.
Each user receives an e-mail message summarizing the information
2. Id. at
3. Id. at
4. Id. at
5. Id. at
6. Id. at
7. Id.
8. Id.

8-9.
9-10.
3.
8.
3.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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16
provided by the user and containing a unique profile ID code number.
The resume profiles are readily available to anyone who visits the Web
site, although visitors are asked for their name, e-mail address, and company name before they can view the profiles. 17 The company name and
in some instances the user's e-mail address are used by EmployExpert.com to filter its search results in order to prevent an employer
from gaining access to its own employees' profiles.1 8
EmployExpert.com gathers its information by asking users to sub19
mit information through an interactive Web page application form.
20
It
e-mail.
and
telephone
The form asks for a user's name, address,
states that this contact information will not be displayed to others so as
to protect the privacy of the individual. 21 The page also requests the
inindividual's age, sex, current and past employment information,2 and
2
formation related to the position that the individual is seeking.
23
At the end of the form is a section labeled "Privacy Preferences."
In this section there are two statements, each of which appears next to a
check box marked "I agree." 24 The boxes are pre-checked, although the
user can uncheck either or both boxes in order to avoid selecting the default responses. 2 5 The first statement says, "In exchange for the services
provided to me by EmployExpert.com, I understand that banner advertisements may appear on the same screen as my profile when it is accessed. I understand that EmployExpert.com may share non-personally
identifiable information with third parties in connection with the banner
advertisements, and is not responsible for the practices of such parties." 26 The second statement says, "I allow EmployExpert.com to use
any additional information, including information gathered by the analysis of cookie technology, to create and add an 'Interests' section to my
resume profile. I understand that EmployExpert.com is not responsible
27
for any misunderstanding or inconsistencies provided in this profile."

Edna Arbeiter, an employee of Arbor Shoes, used EmployExpert.com's services to create a resume profile so that she might find
another job. 28 She completed the entire application. 2 9 She did not un16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 4.

at 4-5.
at 5.

at 6.
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derstand what "cookie technology" was, but felt it was important to include a section in her profile for "Interests," so she did not uncheck either
of the selections under "Privacy Preferences." 30 EmployExpert.com sent
Arbeiter an e-mail message providing her ID code number and summa31
rizing the information that she had submitted.
32
Arbeiter's immediate supervisor at Arbor Shoes was Bill Simpson.
Shortly after EmployExpert.com posted Arbeiter's profile to its site,
Simpson happened to hit on the EmployExpert.com Web site while using
his home American Online ("AOL") account and reviewed Arbeiter's profile. 3 3 This apparently was possible because Simpson was using his personal account on AOL, rather than one provided by Arbor Shoes, and he
34
did not give the company name when he registered with the site.
Although no personal information was visible on the profile page,
Simpson believed the profile belonged to Arbeiter because he was familiar with her past employment history and education. 35 On Monday, he
called Arbeiter into his office and-informed her that because she was ob36
viously looking for another job, she was fired.
After her termination, Edna Arbeiter visited EmployExpert.com to
examine her resume profile as it appeared on the site.3 7 She saw that
EmployExpert.com had added a section entitled "Interests."3 s This section contained information that she did not recognize. 3 9 In particular, it
stated, "This individual is an active and experienced Internet user who
spends several hours per day accessing the Web. 40 Among the Web sites
frequently visited by this individual are news and information sites,
sports sites, employment and finance sites, and weather information
41
sites."
Arbeiter sued EmployExpert.com claiming invasion of privacy since
she neither consented to nor specifically gave EmployExpert.com any of
the information contained in the section entitled "Interests."42 She
claimed that EmployExpert.com's poftrayal of her via the profile had allowed her current employer to identify her, thus resulting in her
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6; see also Appendix A.
R. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7; see also Appendix B.
See R. at 6.
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termination. 4 3
Arbeiter argued that any person familiar with her history could easily identify her by the information contained in the profile.44 She now
asserts that EmployExpert.com invaded her privacy because it displayed
information to which she did not consent and as a result, her employer
was able to identify her due to private information displayed in the
45
profile.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the court of appeals err in holding that the information disseminated by defendant EmployExpert.com was neither private,
nor invaded the plaintiffs privacy as defined by applicable state
law analogous to the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding the
public disclosure of private facts; and:
2. Did the court of appeals err in hold ing that use of cookie technology to gather personal information is not an invasion of privacy?
IV.

BACKGROUND

AN OVERVIEW OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY

1.

The Purpose of Cookie Technology

Commercial Web sites utilize cookie technology for a number of legitimate business purposes. These range from the ability to personalize
information for each user, to identify a customer for online sales and services, or simply for the purposes of tracking popular links and the
demographics associated with particular Web sites. 46 In addition, cookies allow computer users to customize the manner in which they view
particular Web sites. 47 E-commerce sites often place temporary cookies
in order to maintain information about a user's particular visit to the site
and allow for operation of the virtual shopping cart that recalls all of the
items a user has selected until the point of check out when sales are
completed.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Barry D. Bowen, How PopularSites Use Cookie Technology: Shopping Baskets Are
a Natural Use for Cookies, But We Uncovered Several Surprising Uses Too, <http://
www.netscapeworld.com/netscapeworld/nw-04-1997/nw-04-cookies.html>
(last visited
Sept. 12, 2000); David Whalen, The Unofficial Cookie FAQ <http://www.cookiecentral.com/
faq/> (last visited August 30, 2000) (explaining why commercial Web sites utilize cookie
technology); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Internet and Privacy Legislation:Cookies for a
Treat?, Computer Law & Sec. Rep., vol. 14, issue 3, 166 (1998).
47. Bowen, supra n. 46, at 2.
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Cookies are useful for storing consumers' registration information so
that they do not have to enter a login and password on each visit to a
particular Web site. 48 Cookies themselves, however, cannot gather
data.49 Rather, cookies are used as tracking devices to assist firms that
do gather information about Web users. 50 Data that is collected and
mined is usually associated with a value that has been stored within in a
user's cookies. 5 1
2.

Two Types of Cookies: Temporary and Persistent

There are two types of cookies: temporary or persistent. 5 2 Temporary cookies allow a site to spread products and information over multiple pages, or put order entry forms on a separate page. 5 3 As users select
what they want to purchase, the server indexes these selections to a key
carried as a cookie by the Web browser. 54 This technology allows for
what has commonly become known as the virtual shopping cart. Users
may browse through a site, clicking on items they wish to purchase. A
temporary cookie keeps a record of all these items until the time of check
out when a sale is made for all of the items that were accumulated. However, the temporary cookies that facilitate this process are deleted from
the users' hard drives the moment their Web browsers are closed. 5 5
In contrast, persistent cookies are stored on the user's file system
and provide a convenient location to store user preferences that are
likely to be used each time the user visits a particular Web site. 5 6 These
persistent cookies are the mechanism by which a Web site is able to "recognize" a user, greet them by name or even rememberttheir log in I.D.
and password information.
3.

How Cookies Work

Cqokies are transported back and forth between the server hosting a
particular Web site to the end user's computer as an HTTP header. 5 7
After a cookie is transmitted via an HTTP header, it is stored on the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bowen, supra n. 46, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Whalen, supra n. 46.
57. Whalen, supra n. 46.
A cookie contains 6 parameters that can be passed to it:
1. The name of the cookie,
2. The value of the cookie,
3. The expiration date of the cookie,
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user's hard drive within a file allocated for use by the Web browser.5 8
Information is quickly and readily available without re-transmission.
The browser can retain cookies when a user is not browsing; or, when the
computer is shut off since the cookies are stored on the user's hard
drive. 59 A cookie alone cannot read the user's hard drive to find out personally identifiable information such as the user's name, address or income. 60 Rather, the only manner in which such information can end up
in a cookie is if users themselves provide personally identifiable data to
61
Web sites which, in turn, save that data to a cookie.
4.

Limitations of Cookie Technology

Web servers cannot set or read cookies that do not belong to their
own domain. 6 2 For example, Amazon.com cannot read cookies from a
user's hard drive that were placed by its competitor, Borders.com. Notwithstanding this principle, almost every Web user has received a cookie
from "ad.doubleclick.net" at one time or another, without ever having
visiting the Doubleclick Web site. 6 3 Doubleclick and other advertisers
have employed a clever means by which to circumvent this limitation on
cookie placement that enables Doubleclick to track Web users and serve
64
advertising media content.
Most sites on the Internet do not serve their own advertisements.
Rather, they subscribe to a media service such as Doubleclick or 247 Media.6 5 When a user hits on a particular Web site, the page is requested
and assembled through many HTTP requests by the user's Web
browser. 66 First, there is a request for the HTML code for the page itself.
4. The URL path within which the cookie is valid (pages outside the path cannot read or
use the cookie),
5. The domain of the cookie (allows a cookie to be accessible to all the pages of multiple
servers; cookies can be assigned to individual machines, or to an entire Internet domain),
6. The need for a secure connection to exist to use the cookie.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Sandeep Junnarkar, DoubleClick Accused of Unlawful Consumer Data Use, at
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1534533.html> (last visited Apr. 3, 2000). The
lawsuit alleges that DoubleClick employs a sophisticated computer tracking technology,
known as cookies, to identify Internet users and collect personal information without their
consent as they travel around the web. Id.; see also DoubleClick PrivacyStatement <http'/
www.doubleclick.Netlus/corporate/privacy/default.asp?_object-l=&> (last visited Apr. 3,
2000); DoubleClick: The Internet Advertising Solutions Company <httpJ/www.doubleclick.
com> (last visited Apr. 3, 2000).
64. Junnarkar, supra n. 63.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Then, everything else that particular string of code needs is requested,
including images, sounds, and plug-ins.6 7 Ultimately, what appears on
the user's screen as a banner advertisement has been transmitted as an
HTTP header, potentially containing cookies. 68 If the user clicks
through a banner advertisement out of interest, the media service is able
to record the domain name of the destination Web site, thus enabling the
media service to develop a profile as to the types of Web sites the user of
that particular co7nputer tends to visit.
5. EmployExpert.com's Cookies
EmployExpert.com uses persistent cookies in creating profiles of its
users. EmployExpert.com stores the information provided by its users
and indexes the data to a cookie embedded on the user's hard drive. In
addition, EmployExpert.com also subscribes to a media service that
places banner advertisements on the pages within EmployExpert.com's
Web site, thus providing revenue for EmployExpert.com. The media service transmits these banner advertisements to users of EmployExpert.com's site with HTTP headers that write a cookie to the users'
hard drives.
EmployExpert.com uses its own persistent cookie containing a user's
unique ID code in addition to information tracked and provided by its
third-party media service to create the "Interests" section of its users'
profiles.
The recent media coverage of DoubleClick litigation pushes the issue
of cookie technology to the forefront of the legal landscape. 69 However,
there is no legal precedent directly pertaining to use of cookie technology
and privacy. In the early 1970s, the first statutes protecting personal
information from unwarranted access were enacted in Europe. 70 While
the United States has opted for data protection in very limited and specific areas, the European nations have openly embraced comprehensive
data protection acts covering electronic processing of personal
71
information.
In the United States, there are no such comprehensive data acts.
With regard to cookie technology, the nature of the information being
retrieved or collected determines whether that data falls under an existing regulation. In the United States, Federal protection has been ex67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Bob Tedeschi, Giving ConsumersAccess to PersonalData, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2000,
at C6.
70. See Mayer-Schonberger, supra n. 46.
71. See Baker & McKenzie, Flows of PersonalDataBetween the U.S. and Europe: Managing the Legal Risk (ABA Section of Science & Technology Law, 2000 Annual Meeting,
NY, NY) (July 8, 2000 at 137).
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tended in very limited and specific categories. 72 For example, one of the
earliest pieces of legislation regulating data is the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which governs the collection, use and sale of personal data by consumer credit reporting agencies. 73 Subsequently, other laws were enacted to deal with collection and sale of personally identifiable data and
mailing lists. 7 4 One of the most recent pieces of legislation was enacted
specifically to protect the personally identifiable information of minors
who user the Internet. 75 However, despite. the steady progression of
Federal privacy legislation, there is yet to be a law that directly pertains
to the issue of privacy stemming from data collection through cookie
technology. Accordingly, we must turn to legal precedent established
through our courts of law.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
I.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS

To be liable for the tortuous public disclosure of private facts, one
76
must give "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another."
In addition, the matter that is publicized must be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person" and not of "legitimate concern to the public." 77 In
order to properly prove a claim of invasion of privacy through the public
disclosure of a private fact, Prosser states that a plaintiff must prove
78
that the defendant made a matter of private life available to the public.
Specifically, the plaintiff needs to plead and prove (1) there was a public
disclosure; (2) the facts were private; and (3) the disclosure is highly of79
fensive to a reasonable person.
For the first element, courts define public disclosure by examining
80
the number of individuals who were made aware of the private fact.
Courts determine the second element, whether facts are private, through
either determining their lack of availability in any other public form or
72. Id.
73. See 15 USCS § 1681a (2000).
74. Baker & McKenzie, supra n. 71.
75. See 47 USCS § 223 (2000).
76. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also W. Prosser, Torts 856 (5th Ed.1984).
79. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
80. Miller v. Motorola, 202 I1l.App.3d 976, 560 N.E.2d 900, 148 Ill.Dec. 303 (Ill. App.
1990). Miller was an employee of Motorola. Id. Her employer disclosed the fact that she
had a mastectomy surgery to her co-workers. Id. Miller claimed that this disclosure
greatly embarrassed her. Id. The court held that the disclosure to a large number of her
co-workers was adequate to establish the public element of the privacy law. Id. at 903.
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their need to be considered part of an individual's personal profile.8 1 The
courts expanded the third element defining what constitutes "highly offensive" to include those facts that would cause an individual great em82
barrassment or negative results caused by the disclosure.
Even if all of these elements are met, the court still needs to determine that the use of this information is for a wrongful purpose.8 3 In
Shibley, the court determined that although the sale of subscription lists
might amount to the sale of a personality profile, the company intended
to use the information to determine the types of advertisements sent to
individuals.8 4 For this reason the court held that there was no privacy
85
invasion.
The dawn of the exchange of personal information on the Internet
has pushed this elemental approach of privacy invasions to its limits. In
U.S. v. Hambreck, the court held that a customer on the Internet did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to personal information that they disseminated on the Internet.8 6 This has only been broadened by U.S. v. Simons, in which the court held that an employee could
not expect that his or her information would remain private when they
81. See Shibley v. Time, 45 Ohio App.2d 69, 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1975). The court
held that private information can be determined by examining if the information is an
appropriation of one's personality. Id. at 72. In addition, this definition also includes personal facts that need to be kept private to protect the privacies of life. Id.
82. Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 99 Idaho 688, 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978). The court
held that disclosure of an employee's criminal record was sufficiently embarrassing to establish the "highly offensive" element from the Restatement. Id. at 832.
83. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742, 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App.
1995). The sale of card holder's names was not considered wrongful because the sale was
for advertising purposes. Id. at 1354.
84. See Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337. The court held that the sale of subscription
lists was not an invasion of privacy. Id. at 338. The court stated that the profiles were only
being used to determine what advertisements would be sent to those individuals. Id.
Therefore, although the subscribers did not consent to the sale of their information it was
still allowable because the information was to be used for an unacceptable purpose. Id.
85. Id.
86. See State v. Hambreck, 55 F. Supp.2d 504 (D. Va. 1999). The court held that there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy on the Internet when an individual volunteers private information. Id. at 508. The court explained that for an individual to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, an Internet company must knowingly display private
information to others and the Internet company must obtain the information through
means other than disclosure by the individual. Id. The plaintiff in this case attempted to
persuade the court to apply the Katz test. Id. at 505. This test is used to determine if the
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The court did not find this argument persuasive since the element of reasonable expectation of privacy is an objective standard. Id. The court held for the Internet company, relying on the rationale that if a person
knowingly exposes the public to private information they are not entitled to Fourth Amendment privacy protection. Id. at 507.
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are utilizing the Internet at the office.8 7
On the other hand, case law states that financial and medical information is always considered private.8 8 It is, therefore, commonly accepted that any exchange of this kind of information is an invasion of
privacy no matter where the exchange takes place.8 9
Arbeiter may argue that she did not consent to the display of any
personally identifiable information in the public domain. When all of the
information in her profile is viewed in totality, anyone familiar with Arbeiter could easily piece the information together to identify her as the
author. Since Arbeiter did not properly consent to the display of this
identifiable information; specifically that which is contained in the section entitled, "Interests," EmployExpert.com may be found liable for tortiously invading her privacy.
EmployExpert.com may argue that because Arbeiter volunteered
the information and had knowledge that EmployExpert.com intended to
use cookie technology in creating her profile, she cannot properly support
a claim for invasion of privacy. EmployExpert.com in no way breached
her confidentiality. No personal address, telephone or name was shown
and EmployExpert.com may claim that these are the only identifiable
elements to the profile. Since this information was never visible in her
online profile, there was no invasion of privacy.
II.

COOKIE TECHNOLOGY AND LEGAL PRECEDENT

There is currently no case precedent directly addressing the issue of
an invasion of privacy via the use of cookie technology. As a result, both
plaintiff and defendant will have to use strategic creativity when litigating this particular issue. There are several possible theories upon which
87. See U.S. v. Simmons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Va. 1998). The court held that when
an employee uses a computer that is maintained primarily by the employer for work related efforts, the employee's privacy is not invaded if the employer searches the computer's
hard drive. Id. at 327. The court maintained that based upon the facts in this case, the
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy when utilizing the Internet at work. Id.
See also Barry v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 63 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. D.C. 1999). A former employee
brings a privacy action because the employer published a report critical of the employee.
Id. at 26. The court held that the employer was not liable for invasion of privacy because
the report was available prior to its display on the Internet. Id. Because the employer was
required to release the report to the media, the court held that there was no invasion or
privacy nor improper disclosure of private facts. Id. at 28.
88. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742, 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1995)
(holding that credit card holders lack a claim for intrusion into seclusion when credit card
companies rent lists of card holder's names for the purpose of advertising). The court distinguished that any disclosure of financial information would constitute an invasion of the
card holders privacy. Id.
89. Id.
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the litigants may rely but the most likely choice is that of intrusion upon
seclusion.
The landmark California case of Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc.
discussed, in detail, the issue of privacy when gathering personal information through the use of a telecommunication device. 90 In Shulman,
the defendants filmed the plaintiffs, who had all been injured in a car
accident, as they were being extricated from the car during an emergency rescue operation. 9 1 Intrusion upon seclusion is a theory that allows for liability when there is non-consenting physical intrusion into the
home, hospital, or other place the privacy of which is legally recognized,
or where there is an unwarranted sensory intrusion such as eavesdropping, wiretapping, and visual or photographic spying. 92 The essence of
this theory centers on the idea of seclusion. 9 3 "To prove actionable intrusion, a plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding... or obtained unwanted access to
94
data about, the plaintiff."
In the recent case of McVeigh v. Cohen, AOL, an Internet service
provider, surrendered subscriber information about one of its customers,
the plaintiff, to the United States Navy. The Navy believed this data
gave it grounds for a court-martial of the plaintiff.9 5 Among other
things, the data contained in the plaintiffs AOL profile described the
plaintiffs interests such as "collecting pics of other young studs" and
"boy watching." 96 However, it did riot contain the plaintiffs full name,
address, or telephone number.9 7 The court in McVeigh granted the
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Navy from
discharging him from service. 98 The court reasoned that the information
in the profile did not reflect the service that the plaintiff had provided to
the Navy. 99
Using this theory, Arbeiter can similarly argue that the use of cookie
technology in creating her profile constituted an intrusion upon her seclusion. Arbeiter can base her claim on the ground that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy during her surfing activities on the
Internet. EmployExpert.com's profiling activities were an unwarranted
90. Shulman v. Group W Prod., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998).
91. Id. at 474, 475.
92. Id. at 490.
93. Id.
94. Id. (Emphasis added).
95. McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1607, 1626 (Nov. 1999).
96. McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 217.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 221.
99. Id.
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intrusion upon her zone of privacy. The collection of information which
EmployExpert.com placed on its Web site intruded upon Arbeiter's sensory privacy as it gave others unwarranted access to data about her.
In defense, EmployExpert.com can argue that Shulman and McVeigh do not directly address the issue presented before this court as
neither is factually analogous to the case at bar. Both Shulman and McVeigh address data that is encompassed within the areas traditionally
protected by privacy laws. l0 0 In contrast, the information in Arbeiter's
profile is not within the categories of medical, financial, or sexual data.
Accordingly, the established privacy laws do not govern the information
as disseminated.
EmployExpert.com may also argue that by accepting the terms and
conditions posted at its Web site, Arbeiter consented to any intrusion,
thereby negating any claim she has raised. It is well accepted that clickthrough agreements are valid and binding contracts where the vendor
remains the master of its offer. In the case of Caspi v. The Microsoft
Network, L.L.C., for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, upheld the validity of a click-through agreement formed
between the plaintiffs and The Microsoft Network ("MSN").1° 1 The plaintiffs were shown MSN's terms and conditions on the registration screen
for defendant's Internet service. Prospective members were required to
click "I Agree" or "I Don't Agree" and registration did not occur until
users had the opportunity to view and click to accept MSN's terms. Similarly, Arbeiter agreed to the terms and conditions posted at the EmployExpert.com's Web site before she was permitted to utilize its services.
Finally, EmployExpert.com may rely on the fact that a third-party
media firm responsible for banner advertisements collected most of Arbeiter's data which is at issue. EmployExpert.com's privacy policy,
which is part of the terms and conditions accepted by Arbeiter, specifically disclaims responsibility for the actions of such sites. As the vendor,
EmployExpert.com is master of its offer that Arbeiter, in turn, accepted
and used to her own peril. Since EmployExpert.com can demonstrate
that Arbeiter had knowledge of these terms and conditions before using
the Web site's services, EmployExpert.com may successfully defeat Arbeiter's claims.

100. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351.
101. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. 1999).
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APPENDIX A
EMPLOYEXPERT.COM PROFILE APPLICATION

You provided the following information in the application that you
completed at our Web site. Please return to our site if you wish to make
any revisions or corrections to this information. Your profile ID code
number is 0992. You will need that number and the password that you
selected in order to change this information. Please contact us at
webmaster@employexpert.com if you have forgotten your password or if
you have any other questions. Thank you for using EmployExpert.com!
CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL PROFILE
(None of the following information will be made available without
your specific authorization.)
NAME: Edna Arbeiter
STREET ADDRESS:

1356 W. Roscoe

CITY: Springfield
STATE: Marshall
ZIP CODE:

60690

PHONE NUMBER:

312-427-2737

E-MAIL ADDRESS:

Arbeiter@marshallonline.com

GENERAL PROFILE
(Some or all of the following information will be available to persons
who visit our site.)
AGE: 43
SEX: F
GEOGRAPHIC AREA: Midwest
Education:
INSTITUTION:
DEGREE:

B.A.

FIELD/MAJOR:

Marshall State University
DATE:

1979

Communications

Current employment:
(This information is vital to assist us in blocking your current
employer from viewing your profile. Your current salary will not appear
with your profile, but employers who visit our site may search for candidates with current or desired salaries within a particularrange.)
COMPANY:

Arbor Shoes

CITY: Springfield
STATE: Marshall
DURATION: 1996 to present
TITLE: Regional Sales Manager
SALARY: $45,000
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Increased sales, doubled representatives' sales,
suggested new product ideas.
Previous employment:
(1) COMPANY: LitWare, Inc.
CITY: Humboldt
STATE: Marshall
DURATION: 1979-1987
TITLE: Senior Sales Representative
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Increased sales revenue, expanded sales teams,
suggested and selected new products.
(2) COMPANY: Ferguson and Bardell
CITY: Horner
STATE: Marshall
DURATION: 1987-1996
TITLE: District Sales Manager
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Increased regional sales, managed 250 sales representatives in 10 states, trained all new recruits.
Position Sought:
DESIRED JOB TITLE: National Sales Manager
DESIRED SALARY:

OBJECTIVES:

$60,000

Continue working to increase sales with new company

and become more involved with the implementation of product ideas.
GEOGRAPHICAL/OTHER RESTRICTIONS: None
PRIVACY PREFERENCES
(You may visit our site at any time to change your preferences, but be
aware that limiting the information that may be gathered by or made
available through EmployExpert.com may reduce the number of potential
employers that view your profile. For more information, please see the
Privacy Policy Statement on Web site.)
In exchange for the services provided to me by EmployExpert.com, I
understand that banner advertisements may appear on the same screen
as my profile when it is accessed. I understand that EmployExpert.com
may share non-personally identifiable information with third parties in
connection with the banner advertisements and is not responsible for the
practices of such parties.
I agree to allow EmployExpert.com to use any additional information, including information gathered by the analysis of cookie technology,
to create and add an "Interests" section to my resume profile. I understand that EmployExpert.com is not responsible for any misunderstanding or inconsistencies provided in this profile.
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APPENDIX B
Profile No. 0992
Position Sought

National Sales Manager

Objective

Continue working to increase sales with new
company and become more involved with the
implementation of product ideas.

Experience

Regional Sales Manager (4 years)
* Increased sales, doubled representatives' sales,
suggested new product ideas
District Sales Manager (9 years)
* Increased regional sales, managed 250 sales
representatives in 10 states, trained all new recruits
Senior Sales Representative (8 years)
* Increased sales revenue, expanded sales teams,
suggested and selected new products

Education

* B.A., Communications

Interests

This individual is an active and experienced Internet
user who spends several hours per day accessing the
Web. Among the Web sites frequently visited by
this individual are news and information sites,
sports sites, employment and finance sites, and
weather information sites.
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APPENDIX C

EmployExpert.com Privacy Policy Statement
EmployExpert.com is strongly committed to protecting the privacy
of all visitors that post personal information on this site. We understand
the sensitivity of one who is seeking a job and wants to provide a trustworthy and safe environment. This statement is meant to explain to
you, the visitor, the actions we implement to maintain your safety.
All personal information that EmployExpert.com collects is gained
on 'a voluntary basis. The contact information that we collect is necessary so that we can contact particular visitors in regards to their profile.
Personal contact information is omitted from profiles created by EmployExpert.com to maintain the privacy of visitors; contact information will
be provided to a particular employer only with your specific
authorization.
In addition, we do not sell or display personal information to anyone
unless required to do so by law or to protect the rights and property of
others. This site contains links to other sites as well as banner ads.
EmployExpert.com is not responsible for the practices or content of such
sites. Therefore, all users should know that when they voluntarily provide personal information, the data can be collected by others.
Our site uses cookie technology to optimize service to our visitors.
These cookies allow us to recognize repeat visitors and make our site
more productive and personalized. If you configure your Web browser to
disable cookies, you may not be able to take advantage of all of the features of EmployExpert.com.
If you have any questions or comments regarding our site, please
feel free to contact us at webmaster@employexpert.com.

224

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIX

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

No. 2000-135

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
OCTOBER TERM 2000

EDNA ARBEITER,
Petitioner,
V.

EMPLOYEXPERT.COM,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
First District Court of Appeals
of the State of Marshall

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Matt Caligur
Mark Callender
Alexandra Smoots Hogan
South Texas College of Law
1303 San Jacinto Street
Houston, Texas 77002-7000
(713) 659-8040
Attorneys for Petitioner
Team #13

226

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIX

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE USE OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY TO GATHER
PERSONAL INFORMATION IS NOT AN INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION?
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY EMPLOYEXPERT.COM WAS NEITHER PRIVATE, NOR INVADED THE
PLAINTIFF'S PRIVACY AS DEFINED BY APPLICABLE
STATE LAW ANALOGOUS TO THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS REGARDING THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
OF PRIVATE FACTS?
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TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF MARSHALL:
Petitioner, Edna Arbeiter, respectfully submits this brief in support
of her request for reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals below.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and order of the Madison County Circuit Court is unreported. The opinion and order of the First District Court of Appeals of
the State of Marshall is likewise unreported and is set out in the record.
(R. at 2-10.)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with section
1020(2) of the Rules for the Nineteenth Annual John Marshall Law
School Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy
Law.
RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The case involves the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977),
which has been reproduced in Appendix A. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D (1977), set out in Appendix B, is also relevant to the issues
set forth in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Edna Arbeiter, an employee of Arbor Shoes, was terminated by her
immediate supervisor, Bill Simpson, because he believed Ms. Arbeiter
was seeking another job. (R. at 7.) Mr. Simpson formed this belief based
on information he discovered while using the World Wide Web site
EmployExpert.com, a site which, unfortunately, Ms. Arbeiter had visited
and supplied information about her employment history. The site was
apparently designed to offer consumers assistance with various employment matters. (R. at 3.) EmployExpert.com receives its revenue from
relationships with firms that place banner advertisements shown to site
visitors as they review the directory of completed profiles. (R. at 4.)
When users register with EmployExpert.com, they are asked to submit personal information that is then used to create a "profile." (R. at 3.)
To create the profile, EmployExpert.com asks its users to provide their
name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address. Users
are also asked to provide information about not only their past employment, but also their present employment, including their current salary.
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(R.at 11.) EmployExpert.com tells its users that providing information
about their current employment is vital to assist the company in blocking a user's current employer from viewing that user's profile. (R. at 11.)
The profile is published on the World Wide Web in resume form, with
personal identifying information such as the user's name, address, and
phone number redacted. Additionally, EmployExpert.com redacts the locations of its users' past employment and other information that might
be used to identify a specific user. (R.at 3-4.)
EmployExpert.com gathers this private information by asking users
to submit information through an interactive Web page application form.
(R. at 4.) This form explicitly promises users that their contact information will not be displayed to others, so as to protect the privacy of the
user. (R. at 4.) EmployExpert.com promises that contact information
will be provided to a particular employer only after receiving specific
prior authorization from the user. (R.at 14.) As far as other information
is concerned, EmployExpert.com boasts in its Privacy Policy Statement
("Privacy Statement") that it is "strongly committed to protecting the privacy of all visitors that post personal information on this site." (R.at 14.)
Despite these assurances, the resume profiles were made available
to anyone who visited the Web site and provided their name, e-mail address, and company name. Although this information was to be used by
EmployExpert.com to filter its search results in order to prevent an employer from gaining access to its own employees' profiles, EmployExpert.com apparently never verified any of this information before
granting visitors access to the stored resume profiles. (R. at 4.)
Shortly after EmployExpert.com published Ms. Arbeiter's profile on
the World Wide Web, Mr. Simpson happened to come across the site
while "surfing" the Internet. Simpson accessed and reviewed one profile
in particular and concluded that it belonged to Ms. Arbeiter because of
his familiarity with her past employment and education. (R. at 6.) Mr.
Simpson was apparently able to view Ms. Arbeiter's profile because
Simpson did not reveal his affiliation with Arbor Shoes when he registered with EmployExpert.com. (R.at 6.) Moreover, Mr. Simpson was
using his personal America Online ("AOL") account to access the Internet, not the account provided to him by Arbor Shoes.
EmployExpert.com's Privacy Statement describes what is accurately
referred to in the online community as an opt out privacy policy. At the
end of the form its users submit is a section labeled "Privacy Preferences." In this section, there are two statements, each of which appears
next to a check box entitled "I agree." The boxes have been automatically
marked in the affirmative by EmployExpert.com, although the user can
uncheck either or both boxes in order to avoid selecting the default responses. (R.at 5.) Although users are told that they may change their
preferences, they are warned that "limiting the information that may be
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gathered or made available through EmployExpert.com may reduce the
number of potential employers that view [the user's] profile." (R. at 12.)
The first statement says that "[in exchange for the services provided to me by EmployExpert.com, I understand that banner advertisements may appear on the same screen as my profile when it is accessed.
I understand that EmployExpert.com may share non-personally identifiable information with third parties in connection with the banner advertisements, and is not responsible for the practices of such parties." (R. at
5.) This actually means that since EmployExpert.com contains links to
banner advertisements, when users voluntarily provide personal information to EmployExpert.com, this information can be collected by others.
(R. at 14.)
The second statement says, "I allow EmployExpert.com to use any
additional information, including information gathered by the analysis of
cookie technology, to create and add an 'Interests' section to my resume
profile. I understand that EmployExpert.com is not responsible for any
misunderstanding or inconsistencies provided in this profile." (R. at 5.)
EmployExpert.com states that cookies allow the company to "recognize
repeat visitors" and make the site "more productive and personalized."
(R. at 14.) Although more sophisticated Internet users may be able to
reconfigure their browser software to disable cookie technology, users
visiting the EmployExpert.com site are warned that if they disable cookies they may not be able to take advantage of all of the site's features.
(R. at 14.)
Ms. Arbeiter completed the entire application. She did not understand the meaning of "cookie technology." Since she felt it was important
to provide a prospective employer information about her "Interests," she
did not uncheck either of the previously checked Privacy Preference
boxes. (R. at 6.) In other words, she failed to opt out of EmployExpert.com's Privacy Policy.
After her termination, Ms. Arbeiter visited EmployExpert.com to examine her resume profile as it appeared on the site. She noticed that
EmployExpert.com had indeed added a section entitled "Interests." Ms.
Arbeiter discovered, to her surprise, that the section contained information she did not recognize. In particular, the section included a statement that read: "This individual is an active and experienced Internet
user who spends several hours per day accessing the Web. Among the
Web sites frequently visited by this individual are news and information
sites, sports sites, employment and finance sites, and weather information sites." (R. at 7.) By displaying this information, EmployExpert.com
invaded Ms. Arbeiter's privacy because it disclosed information that she
did not voluntarily provide. As a result, Ms. Arbeiter's employer identified her, and she was ultimately fired. (R. at 8.)
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SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Edna Arbeiter sued EmployExpert.com in Madison County Circuit
Court, State of Marshall, alleging invasion of privacy and claiming damages as a result of EmployExpert.com's public disclosure of private facts
and intrusion upon her seclusion. (R. at 8.) Neither party disputes the
facts as described in the record below. (R. at 3.) The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of EmployExpert.com in an unreported
opinion.
Ms. Arbeiter appealed to the First District Court of Appeals of the
State of Marshall. (R. at 2.) The court of appeals held that Ms. Arbeiter
did not meet the elements set forth in section 652D of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, recognized by the State of Marshall, concerning the
public disclosure of private facts, since Ms. Arbeiter voluntarily furnished the information in a public forum, the Internet, thereby relinquishing her right to any claim of privacy. (R. at 8.) Additionally, the
court found the information released was in no way offensive. (R. at 8.)
Moreover, the court found that Ms. Arbeiter used EmployExpert.com at
her own peril, since the site's privacy policy was clearly posted and available to all individuals who visit the site. (R. at 9.)
The court also rejected Ms. Arbeiter's intrusion upon seclusion claim
and refused to expand the zone of privacy, as contemplated by the theory
of intrusion upon seclusion, to include Internet "surfing." (R. at 9.) Furthermore, the court stated that EmployExpert.com did not gain unauthorized access to Ms. Arbeiter's private information, and, therefore, no
intrusion upon seclusion was committed. The court also noted that the
data obtained by EmployExpert.com was not highly sensitive information afforded greater protection under privacy laws as the information
was not of a financial, sexual, or medical nature. (R. at 10.) It is from
this decision that Ms. Arbeiter appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
Although society has leaped forward in recent years due to technological advances, these advances should not circumvent long-established
privacy laws. Ms. Arbeiter is an average consumer who is representative
of many consumers in today's society who are susceptible to losing privacy rights on the Internet. With the invention of data-collection technology inevitably comes the need to address privacy concerns. Now more
than ever is the time to recognize consumers' privacy interests when
utilizing online businesses.
The use of cookie technology by EmployExpert.com constituted an
invasion of privacy by an intrusion upon the seclusion of Ms. Arbeiter.
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Under both the risk analysis and zone of privacy tests, Ms. Arbeiter has
established a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ms. Arbeiter had a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because she was
assured of her privacy, in the solitude of her own home, and was powerless to avoid the intrusion by EmployExpert.com. If this Court does not
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in activities carried on in
the home, especially when addressing nonconsensual tracking by a
cookie, then society can expect unreasonable intrusions to become a regular part of daily life. The activities of people in their own homes, especially Internet activities, are private matters. Nonrecognition of this
privacy interest will also result in a drastic decline in online business
and e-commerce. Furthermore, when a business intrudes into the solitude and seclusion of one's own home, it becomes highly offensive to a
reasonable person. At the very least, Ms. Arbeiter has presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact with regard to
these elements, precluding summary judgment.
II.
In the event this Court finds that the tracking of Ms. Arbeiter's private Internet activities is not an intrusion upon her seclusion, it should
still find that EmployExpert.com invaded her privacy by a public disclosure of private facts. The "Interests" section of the resume profile contained private information about activities Ms. Arbeiter engaged in
while in the solitude of her home. Thus, it was a private matter.
EmployExpert.com then violated its own privacy policy by allowing Ms.
Arbeiter's current employer to access her resume profile. Ms. Arbeiter
pled sufficient facts to prove that EmployExpert.com publicized her private facts. With the number of Internet users in society today, one cannot deny that information disclosed on a Web site is highly likely to
reach the general public. Furthermore, a reasonable person would find
it highly offensive to receive assurances of privacy concerning information such as Ms. Arbeiter's, and subsequently learn that the information
has been disclosed to millions of Internet users. Lastly, the information
disseminated by EmployExpert.com was of no legitimate concern to the
public because it is not specified in the Restatement, not customary for
this type of information to be of public concern to the community, and
lacked social value. As a result of these facts, Ms. Arbeiter pled substantial evidence showing that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment with respect to her claim for public disclosure of private facts.
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.

EMPLOYEXPERT.COM'S USE OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY TO
GATHER MS. ARBEITER'S PRIVATE INFORMATION WAS
AN INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION BECAUSE
EMPLOYEXPERT.COM INVADED MS.
ARBEITER'S REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.

"The right of privacy involves the basic right of a person to be let
alone in his private affairs." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890). When Justices
Warren and Brandeis introduced the right to privacy in 1890, they
wisely warned future generations about "numerous mechanical devices
[that] threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' Id. Due to the
rapid growth of the Internet and the expansion of technology in general,
there are substantial concerns about consumer privacy protection in
cyberspace. HarrisPoll: Online Security, Business Week, Mar. 16, 1998,
at http://www.businessweek.com/1998/11/b3569107.htm (survey results
available only online). In particular, some observers are concerned about
Internet businesses intruding into the private affairs of individuals
through the use of advanced technology. Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy:
PersonalData on the Internet, Computer Law., May 1999, at 7, 9.
In the business world, the Internet is seen as a virtual "Wild
West"-a place with few boundaries and even fewer sheriffs policing the
territory. Michael S. Yang, E-Commerce: Reshaping the Landscape of
Consumer Privacy, 33 Md. B.J. 12, 12 (2000). This view has resulted in a
growing distrust among consumers and computer users. The source of
most consumer distrust is the use of cookie technology by online businesses. Ms. Arbeiter is one of the many consumers who has suffered an
invasion of privacy by an online business. EmployExpert.com invaded
Ms. Arbeiter's privacy in two distinct ways. First EmployExpert.com intruded into her home electronically and tracked her personal Internet
activities. Next, EmployExpert.com disseminated Ms. Arbeiter's personal information without her consent. Nevertheless, the Madison
County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to EmployExpert.com
on both issues.
In reviewing the decision of the court of appeals, this Court takes a
de novo standard of review. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). Great caution should be exercised when granting summary judgment because it borders on a denial of due process. ITT CommercialFin.
Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 377 (Mo. 1993).
This Court should accept all allegations of the nonmovant as true and
determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that should
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be resolved by a fact finder. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986). For the reasons set out below, Ms. Arbeiter has
presented substantial evidence to raise several genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the ruling of the circuit court granting EmployExpert.com's motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and this
case remanded for a trial on the merits.
The State of Marshall follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
when analyzing a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Section 652B
states that "[olne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). There need not be any publication
by the defendant for liability to exist under this tort. Id. cmt. b.
As the following sections explain, courts have interpreted section
652B as protecting information and communications in which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The initial threshold of
whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy can be determined by applying two different tests: risk analysis or zone of privacy.
After determining that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the
courts look to whether there was an unauthorized access by the defendant. Finally, courts must decide if the unauthorized intrusion is highly
offensive to a reasonable person. When applying these elements to Ms.
Arbeiter's situation, it is evident that EmployExpert.com intruded upon
the seclusion of Ms. Arbeiter.
A.

Ms.

ARBEITER HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WHEN
USING EMPLOYEXPERT.COM'S SERVICES BECAUSE IT WAS

REASONABLE FOR HER To EXPECT THAT HER
PRIVATE INFORMATION WOULD NOT BE
COLLECTED WITHOUT HER CONSENT.

When one utilizes a computer-based business such as EmployExpert.com, one does not simultaneously surrender one's right to
privacy. Most Internet users reasonably expect privacy on the Internet
due to assurances by their service provider that their privacy will be protected. Dorothy Glancy, United States Privacy on the Internet, 16 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 357, 364 (2000). The compilation of
personal information by Internet-based businesses poses a serious threat
to privacy. In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court stated
that "[the central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information." 429 U.S.
589, 605 (1977). According to Whalen, Ms. Arbeiter had a privacy interest in her personal information and Internet activities. The following
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two sections demonstrate that Ms. Arbeiter retained a reasonable expectation of privacy under both the risk analysis approach and the zone of
privacy test.
1.

Under the risk analysis approach,Ms. Arbeiter had a reasonable
expectation of privacy over the information gathered by
EmployExpert.com.

Some courts have used constitutional analysis to determine whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy over personal information. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978). The Fourth
Amendment has been applied to privacy cases dealing with intrusions
resulting from the electronic collection of personal information about a
person. Id. at 139-40; see also United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d
504, 506 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2000). The United States Supreme Court has held that one's capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends on
whether the person asserting the claim has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967). In determining whether an individual has an expectation of privacy the courts have applied both a subjective and objective test. Id.
Although the Internet is a nonphysical place that may present difficulties in applying traditional privacy analysis, so long as the risk analysis approach of the Supreme Court remains valid, it should be applied to
new and continually evolving technology such as the Internet. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508. As the discussion below illustrates, under
the risk analysis approach, it is difficult to deny that Ms. Arbeiter had a
reasonable expectation of privacy over the information collected and revealed by EmployExpert.com. Under this analysis, Ms. Arbeiter must
first prove that she had a subjective expectation of privacy.
a.

Ms. Arbeiter had a subjective expectation of privacy when using the
services of EmployExpert.com because it assured her the
information would remain private.

Ms. Arbeiter did not forfeit her right to the protection of her private
information when utilizing the services of EmployExpert.com. Even in
the event portions of private information are revealed, this does not extinguish an individual's subjective expectation of privacy. Peckham v.
Boston Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 888, 890 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). In
Peckham, a father sued a newspaper that reported on a paternity suit
against him. Id. at 890-91. Although the claim by the father was for
public disclosure of private facts, the court discussed when a person retains an expectation of privacy after some private facts have been made
public. Id. at 891-92. The court stated that even though some private
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facts have been made public, an individual still retains a right to privacy
over the information not yet made public. Id. at 891. Furthermore, the
court held that whether or not an individual relinquished the right to
privacy in the information is a factual question. Id. at 891-92. If facts
exist showing the plaintiff did not disclose all the private information to
the public, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the individual forfeited the right to privacy. Id. at 892. The mere fact
that Ms. Arbeiter provided EmployExpert.com with some of her personal
information does not give EmployExpert.com the right to further intrude, by using cookie technology to collect information, and then claim
that it is not liable for an intrusion.
EmployExpert.com assured Ms. Arbeiter that the information she
provided would remain private and could not be accessed by her current
employer. (R. at 11.) Ms. Arbeiter did not know EmployExpert.com
would track her Internet activity and use it to build the "Interests" section on her profile, and then allow nearly anyone to access the information. (R. at 7.) The standard "consent check box" is not enough to inform
consumers about the use of cookie technology. When people encounter
an information collection technology such as the cookie, they should be
warned about the information collected and how it will be used. Seth
Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace,
5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 6,
113 (Spring 2000), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/
issue2/v5i2a6-Safier.html. Most consumers click on the "accept" box because they have been assured privacy by the company. Id.
116. When
Ms. Arbeiter hired EmployExpert.com she expected to receive assistance
in locating employment. Clearly, she did not expect EmployExpert.com
to place a cookie on her computer that would track her activities and
then make them public through its Web site.
Finally, Ms. Arbeiter's subjective expectation of privacy stems from
the fact that the information was taken from the solitude of her own
home. The unique quality of the Internet allows users to access vast
amounts of information from home. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the home is afforded a greater degree of privacy protection
than other areas. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000) (stating
that "[t]he recognizable privacy interest . . . is far less important when
'strolling through Central Park' than when 'in the confines of one's own
home,' or when persons are 'powerless to avoid' [the intrusion]."). Ms.
Arbeiter had a subjective expectation of privacy because she was assured
of her privacy, in the solitude of her own home, and was powerless to
avoid the intrusion by EmployExpert.com. For the above reasons, Ms.
Arbeiter raised a genuine issue of material fact as to her subjective expectation of privacy.
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Ms. Arbeiter's subjective expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.

The objectively reasonable prong of the Fourth Amendment privacy
test is both a value judgment and a determination of how much privacy
we should have as a society. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40. The devices
capable of collecting and disseminating private information have multiplied in ways the average person can hardly imagine. Shulman v. Group
W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 473 (Cal. 1998). These advanced devices
necessitate an increase in privacy protections for consumers.
In Shulman, two family members were involved in an automobile
accident. Id. at 474. The intrusion occurred when a rescue crew arrived
accompanied by a camera operator from the defendant's television station. Id. The camera operator filmed the rescue and recorded the conversations inside the rescue helicopter while en route to the emergency
room. Id. The defendant later ran a segment on television depicting the
accident and airing the recorded conversations. Id. The defendant never
obtained consent from the plaintiff to record the conversations or film the
rescue. Id. The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did
not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the camera
operator listening to statements with unaided ears, because they could
be heard by anyone. Id. at 489. However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did retain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conversations recorded by microphone at the scene and while en route to
the emergency room. Id. The California Supreme Court held that it was
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the claims for
intrusion upon seclusion. Id. Therefore, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists over any information recorded without the consent of an individual. Id. at 491.
Ms. Arbeiter's private Internet activities and interests are analogous
to the conversations in Shulman because they occurred in the solitude of
her own home. A reasonable person would not approve of businesses recording personal activities without first notifying the person and obtaining consent, especially those activities that occur within the home.
No law or custom can be found that allows businesses such as EmployExpert.com to access a consumer's private information without consent.
See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (stating that customs
and practices may create a reasonable expectation of privacy). The extent of Ms. Arbeiter's privacy interest is not independent of the circumstances in which the intrusion occurred. See id. One does not open the
door to an Internet business to track one's personal Internet activities by
merely contracting for Internet services. Without uncontroverted proof
that a plaintiff knows personal information or activities are being recorded, a court cannot say as a matter of law that a plaintiffs actual or
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subjective expectation of privacy in the information was unreasonable
under the circumstances. Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F.
Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that a case must survive summary judgment if there is evidence that the plaintiff was not aware that
personal calls would be monitored by the employer). Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Arbeiter retained an
objectively reasonable expectation over her private Internet activities.
Ms. Arbeiter has presented sufficient evidence that she was unaware that EmployExpert.com would use the cookie to record her Internet
activity. In Ali, this was enough for the plaintiffs case to survive summary judgment. "A claim should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957). Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment since a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Arbeiter's subjective expectation of privacy in the information was
objectively reasonable under the risk analysis approach. If this Court
chooses not to utilize the risk analysis approach, it may utilize the zone
of privacy test to determine that Ms. Arbeiter had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
2.

EmployExpert.com violated Ms. Arbeiter's zone of privacy when it
gathered her private information.

An invasion of privacy by intrusion may result from a physical intrusion or some other form of investigation or examination into a person's
private affairs. Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183, 188 (E.D.
Pa. 1995) (listing the possible theories upon which a plaintiff may bring
this cause of action). "This tort encompasses the physical or sensory penetration of a person's zone of seclusion in an attempt to collect private
information concerning that person's affairs." Id. The ability to exclude
others from an individual's mental process is intrinsic to the human personality. Kees v. Med. Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 119 (Ct. App. 1992).
When the intrusion invades an individual's mental process, it intrudes
upon a protected zone of privacy and becomes actionable. Id.
The intrusion by EmployExpert.com was a sensory penetration into
Ms. Arbeiter's zone of privacy. EmployExpert.com's intrusion is exactly
what the Frankel court envisioned when it addressed sensory intrusions-an attempt to collect private information concerning Ms. Arbeiter's affairs. Such a sensory intrusion is just as offensive, if not more
so, than an actual physical intrusion. See Kees, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
Recently, some jurisdictions have held that an unwarranted sensory
intrusion via eavesdropping, wiretapping, and visual or electronic spying
is actionable. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai, 199 F.3d
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1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). In Alpha, the secret monitoring of an individual was held actionable because it denied the plaintiff an important aspect of privacy-the right to control the nature and extent of the
dissemination of private information. Id. The defendant in Alpha recorded the plaintiffs statements during a conversation even though the
plaintiff had not agreed to the recording. Id. The court ruled that the
plaintiff could state a claim for invasion of privacy, even if he had no
expectation of privacy in the statements because he had not consented to
the recording. Id.
The intrusion into Ms. Arbeiter's personal information parallels the
intrusion in Alpha. Ms. Arbeiter was unaware that her Internet activities were being tracked and recorded by EmployExpert.com. (R. at 7.)
Ms. Arbeiter was deprived of a fundamental right of privacy-the right
to control the dissemination of her private information. Allowing companies to intrude upon an individual's right to control personal information
cuts against the most sacred privacy laws. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 240, 251 (1891). This right is not a static right. Rather, it
is a dynamic right that should be flexible enough to protect against new
privacy violations that are the natural product of an ever-changing society of advanced technology. Regardless of whether this Court uses the
risk analysis or zone of privacy test, Ms. Arbeiter has established a reasonable expectation of privacy. After establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy, Ms. Arbeiter must present evidence that
EmployExpert.com's sensory intrusion was unauthorized.
B.

EMPLOYEXPERT.COM USED COOKIE TECHNOLOGY To OBTAIN
UNAUTHORIZED AcCESS INTO THE PRIVATE AFFAIRS OF

Ms. ARBEITER.
Although the laws protecting the collection of information by private
entities are not strict, there are circumstances in which restraint is warranted. Alpha, 199 F.3d at 1089. Courts have acknowledged that the
method in which information is obtained can have an effect on whether
or not the activity is considered an invasion of privacy. McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 79 (8th Cir. 1976). With the increases in
technology today, Internet businesses have a greater ability to intrude
into consumers' private lives without their consent or knowledge.
Unless a browser's preferences are configured to notify the user that
a cookie has been enabled, cookies enter the system unannounced and
undetected. James F. Brelsford & Nicole A. Wong, Online Liability Issues: Defamation, Privacy and Negligent Publishing, at 707, 742 (PLI
Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. 520, 1998). Thus, cookies have the ability to collect and
store information about a person without approval. Ed Foster, Can Mix-
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ing Cookies with Online Marketing Be a Recipe for Heartburn?, Infoworld, July 22, 1996, at 54. In general, cookies allow sites to "tag"
visitors with unique identifiers so the sites can track the user's activities.
Commentators have equated this type of tracking to "a store being able
to tatoo a bar code on your forehead, and then laser-scan you every time
you come through the doors." Joshua B. Sessler, Computer Cookie Control: Transaction Generated Information and Privacy Regulation on the
Internet, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 627, 630 (1997). Some commentators refer to the
use of cookie technology as the most obvious form of intrusion in cyberspace. Myrna L. Wigod, Privacy in Public and Private E-Mail and Online Systems, 19 Pace L. Rev. 95, 107 (1998).
There must be some right to control and protect one's private information from these cookies. The idea of allowing businesses to track the
personal activities of their customers offends the notions of privacy addressed by Justices Warren and Brandeis in their 1890 law review article. See Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195. The fundamental concern
about privacy in cyberspace is the manner in which the systems collect,
process, use, and store vast amounts of potentially sensitive, personal
information. "One need not think long nor hard regarding the possibilities and implications of new technology to develop Orwellian visions regarding the capacity of the Government and, ever increasingly, the
private sector to gather, sort and process massive amounts of information regarding ourselves." Safier, supra, at 10.
The collection of Ms. Arbeiter's information by EmployExpert.com
was unauthorized for two reasons. First, Ms. Arbeiter did not voluntarily release the information that EmployExpert.com obtained through
the use of the cookie technology. (R. at 7.) Second, Ms. Arbeiter was not
fully informed as to how the cookie would collect information and what
information it would collect. (R. at 6.) She believed that if she did not
allow the use of cookie technology by EmployExpert.com then she would
not benefit from the services provided by EmployExpert.com. (R. at 12,
14.) These two reasons confirm that the collection of Ms. Arbeiter's personal information by EmployExpert.com was unauthorized.
1. Although EmployExpert.com's privacy policy states that all
information is collected on a voluntary basis, Ms. Arbeiter did
not voluntarily offer the information pertainingto her
personal interests to EmployExpert.com.
To maintain a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must
not voluntarily consent to the activity by the defendant. NCAA, 865 F.2d
at 648. Whether the information in question is provided voluntarily
turns on the extent to which the data gathering is known by the individual. Norman-Bloodshaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1270
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(9th Cir. 1998); see also Dweyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351,
1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (implying that when the gathering of data is
somehow disguised from the user, the information is not voluntarily
offered).
Companies such as EmployExpert.com use standard language in
their attempt to obtain consent from consumers. (R. at 5.) Users usually
complete forms disclosing basic information that is required before utilizing a company's services. The average user cannot fully appreciate the
extent to which that information is used and the questionable methods
employed to collect the information. Wigod, supra, at 104.
In Norman-Bloodshaw, several employees sued their employer, alleging that nonconsensual testing for sensitive medical information was
an invasion of their privacy. 135 F.3d at 1264. The employer informed
the employees that they would be required to take an entrance examination that consisted of a series of questions and a blood and urine analysis. Id. However, the employer used the blood and urine analysis to test
for sensitive medical conditions such as syphilis, sickle cell trait, and
pregnancy. Id. The employees argued the testing for these sensitive
medical conditions was done under the disguise of the routine entrance
examination. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and
stated that the samples were "qualitatively different from the information provided in their answers to the questions, and [were] highly invasive." Id. The employees' consent to the entrance examination does not
abolish their right to privacy in other personal matters such as their private medical conditions. Id.
The collection by EmployExpert.com is analogous to the situation in
Norman-Bloodshaw because the collection was disguised from Ms. Arbeiter, and therefore, involuntary. Ms. Arbeiter did not consent to the
tracking of her private Internet activities and interests by EmployExpert.com. (R. at 7.) EmployExpert.com utilized an invisible cookie to
collect the information. This cookie was disguised from Ms. Arbeiter because once the cookie is enabled, it does not obtain the user's consent
before collecting personal information. Peter McGrath, Knowing You All
Too Well, Newsweek, Mar. 29, 1999, at 48 (addressing the privacy implications that arise once cookies are enabled). The Ninth Circuit implied
that if the plaintiff is not aware of the data collection, then it is likely
nonconsensual. See Norman-Bloodshaw, 135 F.3d at 1270. According to
the Norman-Bloodshaw analysis, EmployExpert.com collected Ms. Arbeiter's private information without her consent.
In 1971, the Ninth Circuit faced a case with similar facts to Ms. Arbeiter's. In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., the court held that the recordation
and transmission of the plaintiffs private information without his consent constituted an invasion of privacy. 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir.
1971). The defendants in Dietemann were two magazine reporters who
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recorded and transmitted conversations by the plaintiff and then used
the information in a Time Magazine article. Id. at 246. The reporters
used hidden cameras and microphones to obtain the information without
the plaintiffs consent. Id. In finding an invasion of privacy, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that although there was no physical intrusion, the tort
of invasion of privacy by intrusion is applicable when the defendant "intrudes into spheres from which an ordinary man in plaintiffs position
could reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be excluded." Id. at 248-49.
EmployExpert.com intruded into a sphere in which Ms. Arbeiter
could reasonably expect seclusion. The information obtained by the
cookie was personal to Ms. Arbeiter and did not serve the purpose of
assisting Ms. Arbeiter in locating further employment. Furthermore,
Ms. Arbeiter was not fully informed by EmployExpert.com as to what
information the cookie would collect. (R. at 5, 14.)
This unauthorized recording of private information is exactly what
the Dietemann court ruled an invasion of privacy. Id. at 246. Ms. Arbeiter was assured that her personal information would remain private
when utilizing EmployExpert.com's services. (R. at 4.) Furthermore,
EmployExpert.com did not inform Ms. Arbeiter that it would track her
private Internet activities. Although aware that EmployExpert.com
used cookie technology, Ms. Arbeiter was not informed as to the data
collection abilities of the cookie. Therefore, the intrusion by EmployExpert.com was unauthorized.
2.

EmployExpert.com's privacy policy stated that if Ms. Arbeiter did
not allow the use of the cookie technology she would not benefit
from the services provided by EmployExpert.com.

Ms. Arbeiter did not have much discretion when it came to her decision on whether to agree to the terms of EmployExpert.com's consent
form. Her choices were to consent to the cookie, or not benefit from the
services of EmployExpert.com. (R. at 12, 14.) EmployExpert.com uses a
method known as the opt out method to obtain consent from its consumers. (See R. at 12.) This approach requires the consumer to comply with
its methods of obtaining the information. Noncompliance results in the
inability of the consumer to benefit from the services provided by
EmployExpert.com. Id.
The deficiencies in the opt-out system are apparent. The level of
consumer education and understanding of technological advances in information vary widely. Safier, supra,at 121. Most consumers do not realize that when the cookie is enabled, it tracks all Internet activity and
stores information about the user. Increased education is not a likely
solution because Internet businesses will always stay one step ahead of
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the education, leaving consumers hopelessly facing highly advanced collection technologies. Id.
The alternative method is known as the opt in method. Internet
businesses refuse to utilize this method because it costs more and results
in a greater restriction on the access to information. Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 877, 894 (2000). The opt-in
method requires the consumer to affirmatively consent to the use of
cookie technology and other data collectors before they may be enabled.
In summary, the opt-in method is not preferred by Internet businesses
such as EmployExpert.com because it requires them to obtain permission before gathering personal information about their consumers. Id.
Many consumers in today's market have expressed concerns about
the opt-out method. One survey found that 83 percent of the participants surveyed on this question said there should be a law requiring an
opt-in procedure instead of the opt-out method. Public Attitudes About
the Privacy of Information, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (June 1996), at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/invasion.htm. This same survey stated
that 74 percent of the public is very concerned about the violation of their
privacy rights through the Internet and the use of cookie technology. Id.
Furthermore, 65 percent of the public stated that they are more concerned about privacy violations than they were five years ago. Id.
It is against public policy to allow companies such as EmployExpert.com to employ these methods of data collection without first fully
informing consumers as to exactly what information the cookie will
gather. The use of cookie technology on innocent and helpless consumers
such as Ms. Arbeiter places every American at risk that Internet companies will monitor their private activities. This Court should recognize
such practice as deceptive, and an intrusion into the private affairs of
consumers.
C.

IT Is HIGHLY OFFENSIVE

To A

REASONABLE PERSON

PRIVATE INFORMATION RECORDED

By A

To

HAVE

COOKIE.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that an intrusion be
highly offensive to a reasonable person before it becomes actionable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). The intrusion must be one
resulting from conduct to which a reasonable person would strongly object. Ali, 929 F. Supp. at 1381. In Ali, the court held that the interception of business telephone calls by an employer did not constitute an
intrusion upon seclusion because the court did not believe that it is
highly offensive to a reasonable person to have an employer intercept
and monitor business calls. Id. at 1382. However, the court went further to state that a reasonable person could find it highly offensive to
have personal calls monitored if the employer did not discourage the use
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of business telephones for personal calls and did not inform the employee
that personal calls might be recorded. Id. The Ali court held that the
recordation of these telephone calls was an invasion of the privacy of the
employees. Id.
The circumstances in Ms. Arbeiter's case present a much more offensive intrusion than that addressed in Ali. Not only was the information
taken personal in nature, it was gathered without her knowledge. This
is highly likely to be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. The
fact that she is a consumer and not an employee makes the intrusion
even more offensive because it seems more intrusive for a business to
record activities engaged in by a consumer at home. See Miller v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the more
secluded the setting, the more likely the intrusion is highly offensive to a
reasonable person).
A plaintiff may use evidence that less intrusive alternatives of data
collection existed to show that the intrusion by the defendant was highly
offensive to a reasonable person. NCAA, 865 P.2d at 656. EmployExpert.com could have implemented a procedure to inform consumers
concerning the extent to which a cookie gathers personal information.
Furthermore, EmployExpert.com could have utilized the opt-in method
instead of the opt-out method. Failure to implement these protective
measures evidences the high degree of offensiveness of EmployExpert.com's intrusion. Id.
Additionally, the method of data collection utilized may itself be offensive to a reasonable person. See McNally, 532 F.2d at 79. The techniques that EmployExpert.com used were objectionable for two reasons.
First, and most importantly, EmployExpert.com provided a vague
description of the cookie, in its consent form, to camouflage the cookie's
true purpose: the nonconsensual collection of private information. The
use of cookie technology to obtain information about a person results in a
nonconsensual collection. Wigod, supra, at 107. The average user would
not understand the capabilities of the cookie after reviewing EmployExpert.com's consent form. Second, EmployExpert.com made empty
promises of blocking out current employers to obtain consumers' confidence. (R. at 4, 11.) It is apparent that these promises were not kept.
Since the techniques used by EmployExpert.com were disguised from
Ms. Arbeiter and, therefore questionable, the collection of her personal
information resulted in a highly offensive intrusion see Tureen v.
Equifax, 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978). Moreover, the Tureen court
recognized, it is important to look at the methods in which the information was collected before ruling that the consumer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. Id.
The questionable techniques used by EmployExpert.com raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Arbeiter had a reasonable
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expectation of privacy in her personal information. The evidence
presented by Ms. Arbeiter raises a genuine issue of material fact as to
the offensiveness of EmployExpert.com's intrusion, precluding summary
judgment.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE DISSEMINATION OF MS.
ARBEITER'S PRIVATE INFORMATION ON
EMPLOYEXPERT.COM'S WEB SITE
CONSTITUTED A PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS.
An individual's right to have personal affairs remain private is one
of the oldest, most precious rights known to Americans. "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251. These words
must not be lost in the rapid growth of technology and the increased
transmission of information in society today.
Just as consumers in the retail market do not shed their constitutional rights upon entering the marketplace, Internet users should not
lose their right to privacy when they utilize Internet services such as
EmployExpert.com. While the Internet offers users a way to avoid the
physical world, it also allows Internet-based businesses greater opportunity to intrude into private lives. Yang, supra, at 14.
Internet users have soared from 171 million in 1999 to 304 million
as of March 2000. Int'l Tech. & Trade Assoc., United States Internet
Council, State of the Internet 2000 (Sept. 1, 2000), available at http:/l
usic.wslogic.com/intro.html. The U.S. Internet Council estimates there
will be approximately one billion Internet users by 2005. Id. A recent
poll found that 92 percent of polled Web sites collect personal information from online users. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A
Report to Congress (June 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. "According to the results of a March 1998 Business Week survey, consumers not currently using the Internet ranked
concerns about the privacy of their personal information and communications as the top reason they have stayed off the Internet." Id. Now,
more than ever, is the time for consumer privacy protection to be emphasized on the Internet.
While the online consumer market is growing exponentially, there
are also strong indications that consumers are wary of participating in a
market in which they are concerned about the use of their personal information. In fact, a substantial number of online consumers would rather
forego information or services available through the Web than provide a
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Web site personal information without a clear understanding of how the
site's privacy policies are employed. Id. Consumers will continue to distrust e-commerce companies unless greater consumer privacy protections are implemented.
The State of Marshall follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
when analyzing a case in which an individual claims public disclosure of
private information. Section 652D states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
A person invades the privacy of another when he or she publicly discloses private facts about that person, and the disclosure would be highly
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g
Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667-68 (Ct. App. 1984) (applying section 652D of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
As the following sections explain, courts have interpreted section
652D as establishing a four-part test. First, a plaintiff must show that
the disclosure involved a private matter. Second, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant actually gave publicity to the information.
Third, the publicity by the defendant must be found highly offensive to a
reasonable person. Lastly, the matter disclosed must be of no legitimate
concern to the public.
A.

THE INFORMATION COLLECTED AND DISSEMINATED By

EMPLOYEXPERT.COM WAS PRIVATE INFORMATION BECAUSE IT
WAS PERSONAL AND ITS DISCLOSURE HAD
PROFOUND EFFECT ON Ms. ARBEITER.

A

In order to pursue a claim for public disclosure of private facts, a
plaintiff must first show that the information involved a private matter.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d
371, 377 (Colo. 1997). The disclosure by EmployExpert.com contained
personal information about Ms. Arbeiter, such as the Internet sites she
visited and her personal interests. (R. at 7.) Such personal information
is considered a private matter. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D
cmt. b (1977); accord City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
552, 559 (Ct. App. 1999). Whether a public disclosure involves a private
matter is a question of fact for the jury. Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824,
829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). Information concerning family, sexual, medical, and other personal information is expressly protected by the courts.
Id. The information disseminated by EmployExpert.com falls under the
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category of "other personal information," because it is sensitive private
information that might reveal her identity.
In some instances, the effect of disclosure on the individual can determine whether that person has a privacy interest in the information.
City of San Jose, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564. The disclosure of Ms. Arbeiter's
private information resulted in the loss of her job. Due to this profound
effect, Ms. Arbeiter had a substantial privacy interest in the information.
To avoid the profound effects of public disclosures similar to Ms. Arbeiter's, this Court should recognize Ms. Arbeiter's privacy interest in
her personal information.
1.

Ms. Arbeiter did not relinquish her reasonableexpectation of
privacy by relying on EmployExpert.com assurancesthat her
information would remain private.

Ms. Arbeiter did not waive her right to privacy by providing limited
information to EmployExpert.com through its Internet services. Although the Internet is arguably a public forum, Ms. Arbeiter provided
her information for the exclusive purpose of the resume profiling
database. She did not provide this information with the knowledge that
it would be made accessible to her current employer. Legitimate expectations of privacy cannot be eliminated by a sudden announcement that
a certain domain is now a public forum. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 n.5 (1979).
When a business such as EmployExpert.com states that the information provided by its customers will remain private, a later disclosure
of this information to the public is actionable. Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). In Doe, the
plaintiff sued a television station for failing to protect her identity during
a broadcast concerning problems with recent plastic surgery. Id. The
plaintiff agreed to an interview on television under the condition her
identity would remain private. Id. The television station assured the
plaintiff that her identity would remain anonymous during the broadcast. Id. However, during the broadcast, the station experienced technical difficulties with the protection device, revealing the plaintiffs
identity. Id. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had voluntarily
agreed to the interview, and therefore, the information was no longer
private. Id. The court held that summary judgment should not have
been granted to the defendant because the plaintiff had stated a viable
invasion of privacy claim for public disclosure of private facts. Id. at 65.
The court's reasoning turned on the fact that the defendant assured the
plaintiff that her identity would remain anonymous. Id.
Ms. Arbeiter's case presents facts similar to Doe. EmployExpert.com
assured Ms. Arbeiter that her identity would remain private. In fact,
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EmployExpert.com went so far as to expressly promise that a current
employer could not access the information. (R. at 4.) The privacy protection system employed by EmployExpert.com failed to protect Ms. Arbeiter, making her personal information accessible to nearly anyone on
the Internet, including her current employer, who was then able to identify Ms. Arbeiter. (R. at 7.)
Under the Doe analysis, the court must determine if EmployExpert.com's privacy policy left Ms. Arbeiter with an expectation of privacy in her personal information. Since EmployExpert.com's privacy
policy stated that her identity would remain anonymous and that current employers could not access her information, it is clear that the resume profiling database was not a public forum. Once Ms. Arbeiter
establishes that EmployExpert.com's resume database is not a public forum, it follows that she did not relinquish her right to privacy when providing information to EmployExpert.com.
2.

Limited disclosure of private information does not result in the
forfeiture of an individual'sprivacy interest in the information.

Although Ms. Arbeiter provided EmployExpert.com with information for her resume profile, this does not render the information public.
A limited disclosure of private information does not necessarily mean the
information is public and can be disseminated further by the recipient.
Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841 (C.D. Cal.
1998). In Michaels, the court ruled that although a clip of Mr. Michaels
having sex had been displayed on the Internet, Mr. Michaels retained his
privacy interest in the tape. Id. In that decision, the court stated that a
limited disclosure of private information does not result in a forfeiture of
the individual's privacy interest. Id. Rather, an individual retains the
right to privacy in private information until it becomes public.
Ms. Arbeiter's limited disclosure to EmployExpert.com did not result
in a waiver of her privacy interest in the information. She provided a
limited amount of information to EmployExpert.com for the purpose of
building a resume profile. Ms. Arbeiter did not intend for the information to be accessible by anyone. Like Michaels, the limited disclosure to
EmployExpert.com did not result in a publication of the information.
Therefore, Ms. Arbeiter did not forfeit her right to privacy in the information disclosed on EmployExpert.com's Web site. After establishing
the information disclosed involved a private matter, Ms. Arbeiter must
show that EmployExpert.com gave publicity to the information.
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EMPLOYEXPERT.COM GAVE PUBLIcITY To Ms. ARBEITER'S PERSONAL
INFORMATION By ALLOWING NEARLY UNLIMITED ACCESS To
HER PRIVATE INFORMATION.

Once the plaintiff has established a privacy interest in the information, he or she must show that as a result of the disclosure, the private
matter is likely to reach the general public. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D cmt. a (1977); Tureen, 571 F.2d at 419 (applying section
652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Publicity refers to the information becoming public as a result of the defendant's disclosure or communication. Id. Publicity can be shown by illustrating that the
communication was made to the public at large, or to enough persons
that the matter must be regarded as likely to reach the general public.
Id. When private information is disclosed on the Internet, it is highly
likely the information will reach the general public. ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The Internet is a worldwide communications system that allows tens of millions of people to exchange information. Id.
Furthermore, a disclosure to a single person could be actionable publicity if the circumstances are strong enough. Miller v. Motorola, Inc.,
560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); accord McSurely v. McClellan,
753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Miller, an employee consulted her
employer's company nurse concerning medical surgeries. 560 N.E.2d at
902. The nurse assured her that all medical information would remain
confidential. Id. Approximately one year later, a co-worker asked her
about the surgeries and other subsequent health problems. Id. After realizing the information had been disseminated to others, the plaintiff
brought suit for public disclosure of private facts. Id. The court noted
that when a special relationship exists, as it did in Miller, the disclosure
is just as devastating even though it is made to a small number of people
or even a single person. Id. at 903.
The privacy protection provided by EmployExpert.com did not adequately protect Ms. Arbeiter. EmployExpert.com allowed almost unlimited access to the information posted on its Web site. It did provide some
protection by implementing a system that recognized current employer
domain names. The system attempted to screen out employers that used
domain names similar to that of their company names. (R. at 6, 11.)
However, as evidenced by Ms. Arbeiter's circumstances, these protections were not adequate.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Ms. Arbeiter transmitted information to EmployExpert.com did not result in publicity of the information
because she was assured that the information would remain private.
Ms. Arbeiter had no intent of publicizing the information. On the contrary, when EmployExpert.com disseminated the information, it became
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public. The information retained its private character when Ms. Arbeiter provided it to EmployExpert.com, and, therefore, she had a privacy interest in the information remaining private. Ms. Arbeiter has
pled substantial evidence that EmployExpert.com gave publicity to her
private information. In addition to proving EmployExpert.com gave publicity to a private matter, Ms. Arbeiter must also present evidence that
the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
C.

THE DISCLOSURE OF Ms. ARBEITER'S PRIVATE INFORMATION IS
HIGHLY OFFENSIVE To A REASONABLE PERSON DUE To THE
SEVERE CONSEQUENCES ACCOMPANYING

THE DISCLOSURE.

The strength of an individual's interest in having private information protected from publicity largely depends on the consequences of the
disclosure of the information. City of San Jose, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564.
Under this analysis, a person who might suffer severe consequences from
a disclosure of private information has a very strong interest in the protection of this information. The stronger the interest in protecting the
information, the more likely the disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id. With a substantial portion of the world's population
on the Internet, the privacy protections for information on Web sites
such as EmployExpert.com are of great concern. McVeigh v. Cohen, 983
F. Supp. 215, 221 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing the importance of protecting
Internet users against intrusions and disclosure of their private
information).
The term "highly offensive" has been construed to mean a disclosure
that might cause emotional distress or embarrassment to a reasonable
person. Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1302 (4th Cir. 1983).
The determination of whether a disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person is a question of fact and depends on the circumstances of
each case. Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997). In Ozer, a
law firm discharged an associate due to his sexual orientation. Id. at
373-74. Mr. Borquez disclosed his homosexuality to Mr. Ozer, the president of the law firm. Id. at 374. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ozer disclosed
the information to the law firm's managing partner, and the managing
partner subsequently fired Mr. Borquez. Id. The court held that this
disclosure was highly offensive to a reasonable person due to the severe
consequences that accompanied the disclosure. Id. at 378.
The consequences suffered by Ms. Arbeiter were the same as those
suffered by Mr. Borquez. Although the content of the information differed, the consequence of the disclosure resulted in the loss of employment in both cases. Reasonable persons would consider it highly
offensive to have their private Internet activities publicized, especially if
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the publicity resulted in the loss of their job. After presenting evidence
that EmployExpert.com's disclosure of private information is highly offensive to a reasonable person, Ms. Arbeiter must also show the information is of no legitimate concern to the public.
D.

THE PRIVATE INFORMATION DISSEMINATED

WAS NOT OF LEGITIMATE CONCERN

To

By

EMPLOYEXPERT.COM

THE PUBLIC BECAUSE

THE CONTENT OF THE DISCLOSURE WAS PRIVATE
INFORMATION ABOUT

No

Ms.

ARBEITER WITH

SOCIAL VALUE.

The right of an individual to keep information private must be balanced with the public's right to disseminate newsworthy information.
Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981). However, a
person's right to privacy should not be trampled by a society that has
become ever more curious about the lives of others. We must not forget
the important societal interest of protecting an individual's right to privacy. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971). A
person's private information that lacks social value or concern to the
public should be kept private. Id. If this Court were to hold, that as a
matter of law, private facts concerning a person's life are of legitimate
public interest, almost everyone's private life would be on display. See
Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing the importance that the information must be of a legitimate public
concern to be considered newsworthy).
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, the
court should first look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance.
Id. at 878-79. Here, the information about Ms. Arbeiter is not expressly
mentioned as newsworthy in section 652D. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977) (identifying matters that are usually found
newsworthy); accord Winstead, 517 N.W.2d at 878.
Next, the court should look to the customs and conventions of the
community for guidance. Peckham v. Boston Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d
888, 893 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). It is customary in most communities for
the public to have an interest in criminal matters, police action, and
other enforcement of the criminal laws. Williams v. KCMO Broad. Div.
Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). However, the court
must draw the line when the information disclosed is that which the
public is not entitled. Peckham, 719 N.E.2d at 893. A person's private
Internet activity is of no concern to the public. The courts have never
held that the public has an interest in an individual's choice of magazine
subscription, and Internet activities, in some respects, are no different
than reading through magazines or catalogs. Without these protections,
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we can expect a society that routinely invades other citizens' private
lives for no legitimate purpose. Id.
This Court should also determine the amount of social value in the
information disseminated. Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of N.
Am., 787 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that information with a
high social utility is more likely to be found newsworthy). The information concerned personal data about Ms. Arbeiter and did not interest the
public in any way. Furthermore, the information does not improve society in any way. Therefore, the social utility in Ms. Arbeiter's private
activities is minimal.
The last factor the court addresses is the extent to which Ms. Arbeiter subjected herself into the public domain. Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967). Ms. Arbeiter did not intend to publicize her identity or her private Internet activities when she hired
EmployExpert.com. EmployExpert.com assured Ms. Arbeiter that her
information would remain private, and in no way did Ms. Arbeiter intend
to subject herself into the public spotlight.
Not only is Ms. Arbeiter's information not specified as newsworthy
in section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, once the additional
factors used by courts are applied to the information, there is only one
reasonable conclusion-the information is not of legitimate concern to
the public. However, in the event this Court finds that reasonable minds
could differ concerning its newsworthiness, then the question should be
submitted to a jury. Winstead, 517 N.W.2d at 879. Both of the outcomes
discussed above result in the issue of newsworthiness surviving a summary judgment motion. Since the evidence above raises genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Ms. Arbeiter's private facts were disclosed
to the public, summary judgment is improper. Accordingly, the decision
of the court of appeals should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Arbeiter has affirmatively established a reasonable expectation
of privacy in her personal information and Internet activities under the
risk analysis approach and the zone of privacy test. She engaged in the
Internet activities in the privacy of her own home, and retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in doing so. The collection and dissemination
of Ms. Arbeiter's personal information by cookie technology is highly offensive to a reasonable person since the intrusion occurred by recording
information without her informed consent. Furthermore, the dissemination was highly offensive because of the severe consequences that accompanied the disclosure. Ms. Arbeiter's private Internet activities
contained no social value, and were, therefore, of no legitimate concern to
the public.
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No matter how the information is obtained, the subsequent publicity
of a private matter creates liability under section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Therefore, even if the court finds that Ms. Arbeiter consented or voluntarily offered the private information to
EmployExpert.com, this does not relieve EmployExpert.com from liability for the public disclosure of her private information. Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that a public disclosure
of private facts is actionable even if the information was provided voluntarily by the plaintiff).
The goal of privacy law is to harmonize individual rights with community and social interests. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 29596 (Mo. 1942). One cannot dispute that all individuals give up some privacy by becoming a member of society. However, individuals should not
be forced to surrender personal information to ensure the satisfaction of
society's interest in the free flow of information. If a person's expectation
of privacy becomes obsolete when engaging in business, we can expect to
see a decline in the number of Americans willing to interact in the marketplace. If Americans do not feel a sense of privacy and protection, they
will become hesitant to utilize the Internet and its endless benefits.
With all of the advantages the Internet has provided in this day and age,
it would be a tragedy to allow the invasion of users' privacy to deter people from doing business on the Internet. Therefore, if this privacy interest is not recognized, it will deter consumers such as Ms. Arbeiter from
using the Internet, and one of the greatest technological advances of our
time will become obsolete.
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the First District
Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded to the
Madison County Circuit Court for a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Petitioner

2000]

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

259

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A:
(1977)
APPENDIX B:
(1977)

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
................................................. 260
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
.................................................
260

260

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIX

APPENDIX A
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
APPENDIX B
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT BELOW

The order of the Madison County Circuit Court granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is unreported.
The opinion of the First District Court of Appeals of the State of
Marshall affirming the Circuit Court's decision is contained in the Record on Appeal. (R. 1-16).
II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

A formal statement of jurisdiction is omitted pursuant to §1020(2) of
the Rules for the Nineteenth Annual John Marshall Law School Moot
Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

EmployExpert.com (EmployExpert) is a commercial Web site that
provides users with assistance searching for jobs and preparing for interviews. (R. 3). Users register with the Web site and submit information
to create a profile from which an online resume is generated. (R. 3). EmployExpert provides its employment services free of charge and instead
receives revenues from banner advertisements that can be seen when
visitors access the profile directory. (R. 4).
Users submit their information by entering it on an interactive Web
page application. (R. 4). Users are asked for their name, address, telephone number, e-mail, age, sex, current and past employment, and desired position. (R. 4-5). EmployExpert redacts personal identifying
information from the resume, such as name, address, and telephone
number. (R. 3). Also, within employment histories, other information
such as locations are deleted in order to protect users' identities. (R. 3-4).
Users receive an ID code number after registering in order to refer to
their own information. (R. 4).
The application form contains a section entitled "Privacy Preferences," which provides two statements with pre-checked boxes that can
be unchecked by users. (R. 5). The first statement conveys the understanding that banner advertisements appear when visitors access
profiles, and that EmployExpert may share information that is non-identifying in connection with the advertisements and is not responsible for
practices of other parties. (R. 5). The second statement gives EmployExpert consent to use cookie technology to generate an "Interests"
section for users' resumes and also states that EmployExpert is not responsible for any inconsistencies or misunderstandings that occur in this
process. (R. 5).
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EmployExpert provides access to anyone visiting the Web site after
requesting the name, e-mail address, and company name of each visitor
before permitting access to the resume profiles. (R. 4). These measures
are taken, so that EmployExpert may filter the profiles to prevent employer access to their current employees' profiles. (R. 4).
Edna Arbeiter (Petitioner) decided to use EmployExpert's services in
order to find a new job and created a resume profile after completing the
entire application. (R. 6). Because she wanted an Interests section on
her resume, she did not uncheck either box in the Privacy Preferences
section, even though she did not understand cookie technology. (R. 6).
After applying, Petitioner received her ID number and a summary of her
information. (R. 6, 11-12). None of her personal information was viewable on her profile. (R. 6).
Petitioner's supervisor at her current job, Bill Simpson (Simpson),
accessed Petitioner's profile because he did not enter his company name
and was using his personal e-mail account. (R. 6). Simpson believed he
saw Petitioner's profile because he knew Petitioner's employment and
education history. (R. 6). Simpson fired the Petitioner because she was
looking for another job. (R. 7). After losing her job, Petitioner accessed
her profile and did not recognize the information in the Interests section.

(R. 7).
B.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner sued EmployExpert in Marshall state court for invasion of
privacy for alleged public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon
seclusion. (R. 3). Petitioner argued that her privacy was invaded because she did not provide or consent to the information that appeared in
the Interests section. (R. 7). She also alleged that people that know her
could identify her based on the employment and education information
displayed on her profile. (R. 7). The Madison County Circuit Court
granted summary judgment in favor of EmployExpert on both issues. (R.
2).
The First District Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall affirmed
the trial court's decision and the grant of summary judgment for EmployExpert. (R. 2). The State of Marshall recognizes both the public disclosure of private facts tort and the intrusion upon seclusion tort set out
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1977). (R. 8, 9).
The Court of Appeals held that Petitioner did not meet the elements required to find liability for public disclosure of private facts. (R. 8). Petitioner knew that the information she provided to EmployExpert would
be made public and she relinquished her right to privacy by volunteering
her information in a public forum. (R. 8). Also, EmployExpert clearly
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disclaimed responsibility for actions resulting to users of its site, therefore Petitioner used the site to her own peril. (R. 9).
The court of appeals also held that use of cookie technology was not
an invasion of Petitioner's privacy. (R. 10). The court refused to expand
the zone of privacy to include an individual's "net surfing." (R. 9). EmployExpert did not gain unwanted access to Petitioner's information and
the employment information obtained was not highly personal, as is financial, sexual, or medical information. (R. 10).
On July 28, 2000, this Court granted Petitioner's leave to appeal the
decision of the First District Court of Appeals affirming the Madison
County Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of EmployExpert on both claims of invasion of privacy. (R. 15-16).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
On de novo review, this Court should affirm the summary judgment
granted by the First District Court of Appeals because EmployExpert did
not invade Petitioner's privacy by publicly disclosing private facts. EmployExpert disseminated employment and educational history information that Petitioner provided to the Web site to be used as part of her
online resume, to assist her in finding a job.
Petitioner cannot state a cause of action because she cannot prove
the information she provided was private, publicized, offensive to a reasonable person, and not of legitimate public concern. The information
was not private because Petitioner consented to the information being
used, she provided it in a public forum, the information actually displayed was non-identifying, and the actual recipient already knew the
displayed information. EmployExpert did not publicize the provided information because resume profiles can only be accessed through a login
procedure and the viewing audience is limited to hiring employers.
Further, summary judgment is appropriate because Petitioner's employment and educational information cannot be seen as information
that is offensive to a reasonable person. If this information was offensive, Petitioner would not have included it among the information she
decided to include in her resume. Finally, the displayed information is of
legitimate concern to the hiring public who must know this information
in order to hire experienced employees.
II.
EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy under the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion by the use of cookie technology. Petitioner does
not have a privacy claim because net surfing is not protected within the
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zone of privacy. The zone of privacy was intended to protect the right to
make certain decisions and the right to information privacy. Petitioner's
interests in net surfing cannot rationally be equated to the right to make
fundamental decisions concerning procreation, marriage, and child-rearing. Moreover, Petitioner did not have an information privacy right in
her net surfing activity because the information found in the Interests
section of her resume revealed non-personal information. Further, net
surfing is not a protected activity because it was done in a public forum.
Activities performed in the public do not warrant privacy protection.
Even if this Court found that Petitioner has a privacy interest in
surfing the Internet, Petitioner's claim must fail because she cannot establish that EmployExpert intruded into her solitude and that the intrusion was highly offensive. There was no intrusion into Petitioner's
solitude because EmployExpert did not gain access to Petitioner's net
surfing activity by unlawful means and Petitioner was aware that her
net surfing activity was being monitored. Further, a reasonable person
would not find EmployExpert's activities highly offensive because the
Petitioner could have deactivated the cookies at any time.
Additionally, if this Court finds that Petitioner alleged facts sufficient to maintain a valid cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion,
summary judgment should be entered against the Petitioner because she
consented to have EmployExpert monitor the Internet sites she visited.
By failing to uncheck the "I agree" icon, Petitioner agreed to EmployExpert's privacy policy. Furthermore, because Petitioner consented
to have EmployExpert monitor her net surfing activity, she had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the First District Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent and dismiss
her invasion of privacy claims.
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of the State of Marshall should affirm the decision of the First District Court of Appeals, affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of EmployExpert by the Madison County Circuit
Court. Both the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court properly found
that EmployExpert is not liable for the tort of invasion of privacy.
Pursuant to MARSHALL RULE OF CML PROCEDURE 56(c), a party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the evidence demonstrates the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. MARSHALL R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There are no
issues of material fact for trial because the Petitioner cannot prove the
required elements of either the public disclosure of private facts tort or
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the intrusion upon seclusion tort. Accordingly, the First District Court of
Appeals' decision should be affirmed.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT
EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT INVADE PETITIONER'S
PRIVACY BY DISSEMINATING THE
INFORMATION SHE PROVIDED TO
THE WEB SITE.

EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy by disseminating
the personal employment information the Petitioner provided to the Web
site. The State of Marshall recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy by
publicly disclosing private facts as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1997) ("Restatement"). (R. 8). Petitioner must
prove four elements to hold EmployExpert liable for publicly disclosing
private facts, which include: the information was private, made public,
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and not of legitimate concern to
the public. Id. Because Petitioner cannot prove all four of the required
elements of the tort, there are no facts that create a genuine issue of
material fact to overcome summary judgment, and this Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
A.

EMPLOYEXPERT DISSEMINATED NON-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION THAT
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY PROVIDED TO THE WEB SITE.

Petitioner cannot prove that EmployExpert disseminated private information because the information was purposely disclosed by the Petitioner over the Internet and all identifying information was redacted. In
order to prove liability for public disclosure of private facts, Petitioner
must show that the released information actually was private. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
1.

The information was disclosed by Petitionerin a public forum.

EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy because it merely
disseminated the information Petitioner provided on the Internet. An
individual cannot claim that information is private when he or she
leaves that information "open to the public eye." Id. The right to privacy
is not absolute and can be limited by the express or implied consent of
the individual. Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 339 N.E.2d 274,
277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). Petitioner gave her authorization to release her
employment information to prospective employers (R. 6, 9) and therefore,
the information cannot be private.
Additionally, Petitioner disclosed her information in a public forum,
the Internet, making the employment information a public rather than
private fact. Information that is obvious because the disclosure is done
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in the open is considered a public fact. Chisholm v. Foothill Capital
Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 925, 940-41 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Haynes v.Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., No. 91-C-8143, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2880 at **13, 15
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding the fact the plaintiff was a heavy drinker was a
public fact because his drinking was open and notorious), affd, 8 F.3d
1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
In Chisholm, the plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy when a fellow
employee told potential clients that there was an "overlap" between an
employee's marriage and the same employee's relationship with the
plaintiff. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 939. The court found that there was no invasion because the plaintiffs relationship and the employee's date of divorce were both public facts. Id. at 941. The court reasoned that the
relationship became a public fact because the plaintiff told others about
the affair, the two appeared in public as a couple, and they moved in
together. Id. at 940. The divorce was a public fact because it was a matter of public record. Id. at 941. Because both facts were open to the public, the plaintiff could not establish that the "overlap" comment was a
private fact. Id.
Similarly, in the instant case, Petitioner created public facts out of
her employment history information by offering it for public viewing on
the Internet. The Supreme Court has recognized the Internet as a
unique medium that allows unlimited communication and access to vast
amounts of information. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
Petitioner offered her employment history information for the purpose of
allowing potential employers to access her personal information on the
Internet. Petitioner cannot claim this information was private when she
had knowledge that the information would be accessible to viewers of her
profile.
2.

The information was non-identifying.

Petitioner cannot claim that the disseminated information was private because only non-identifying information could be viewed on Petitioner's profile. The right to privacy requires the use of the personality,
name, or likeness of the individual claiming the violation. Branson v.
Fawcett Publications,124 F. Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Ill. 1954). In Branson,
the district court found that a driver's privacy was not invaded when a
picture of his automobile after a racing accident was published in a magazine. Id. No likeness of the plaintiff was shown and no identifying
marks of the car appeared in the picture. Id. The court found that there
was no invasion because the plaintiff was not specifically identified and
it was only through independent knowledge that a person could discover
that the picture was of the plaintiff. Id.
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In the instant case, EmployExpert only disseminated the position
sought by Petitioner; Petitioner's objective; the titles, descriptions, and
length of time of her past jobs; and her degree. (R. 13) Petitioner was
never specifically identified by name, home address, sex, age, or even job
locations. It was only through her supervisor's independent knowledge
of the specifics of her employment history and education that Simpson
could identify the profile as Petitioner's. (R. 6). Even though people that
are familiar with Petitioner's employment background could deduce that
the disseminated information belongs to her, this does not transform the
information from public to private. Ultimately, the only information EmployExpert is responsible for disseminating is the non-identifying information the Petitioner gave consent to have displayed to potential
employers.
3.

The information disseminated was known by the actual receiver.

EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy because it disseminated information that was already known by the actual receiver, Simpson. Facts are not considered to be private if they are disclosed to people
who already know them. Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1074

n.16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 652D, cmt. a, b (1977)); see also Ledbetter v. Ross, 725 N.E.2d 120, 123
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for public
disclosure of private facts because she only asserted that the facts were
disclosed to her. 725 N.E.2d at 123. The plaintiff argued that a telephone call she received from a social worker invaded her privacy when
the caller disclosed to the plaintiff her own medical information. Id. at
122. The court held there was no liability because the plaintiff already
knew the information the caller gave to her. Id. at 123.
Similarly, in the instant case, the information about Petitioner that
Simpson accessed through EmployExpert was already known to him. (R.
6). Otherwise, he would not have been able to deduce that the profile he
viewed belonged to Petitioner. When EmployExpert disseminated information to Simpson that he already knew, there was only disclosure of
public facts. Therefore, Petitioner cannot reasonably assert that her employment and educational information that was viewable on her profile
was private.
B.

EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT GIVE PUBLICITY TO PETITIONER'S
INFORMATION BECAUSE PROFILE ACCESS WAS LIMITED TO
SPECIFIC USERS.

Even if this Court finds that the personal information disseminated
by EmployExpert was private, EmployExpert cannot be liable for pub-
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licly disclosing those private facts because profile access was limited to
specific users. To prove liability, the Petitioner must show that EmployExpert communicated a private matter to the public at large, "or to
so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 652D, cmt. a (1977); see also Miller v.Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d
900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
In Miller, the Illinois court recognized the "special relationship" exception to the disclosure to the public at large requirement. 560 N.E.2d
at 903. The policy behind the exception is that when a certain relationship exists between the plaintiff and the smaller group, the disclosure of
private information to the group can be just as devastating as when it is
disclosed to the larger public. Id. Fellow employees, family, club members, and church members have been considered to be groups that permit
the special relationship exception to apply. Id. However, the Illinois
courts have found that the exception does not apply when the recipient of
the information has a "natural and proper interest" in the information.
Roehrborn v. Lambert, 660 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (quoting
Midwest, 339 N.E.2d at 278); see also Doe v. TCF Bank Illinois, FSB, 707
N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In the instant case, Petitioner's information was only disseminated
to a limited group of people because the profiles could only be accessed
through a login procedure. (R. 4). Petitioner cannot claim that her employment information was publicized to the extent that the information
became public knowledge. Petitioner cannot even reasonably claim that
she has a special relationship with the intended recipients of her information because the profiles were accessed by potential employers, people
Petitioner doesn't even know.
Petitioner's actual claim is that her privacy was invaded because
EmployExpert disseminated her employment information to her current
supervisor. Although Petitioner can receive the special relationship exception based on the disclosure of private matters to a person's co-workers, Simpson has a proper interest in her employment history. Any
employer has the required natural interest in the qualifications of his or
her employees to be permitted recipients of even private information.
C.

INFORMATION VIEWED ON THE WEB SITE IS NOT HIGHLY OFFENSIVE
TO A REASONABLE PERSON.

To prove liability, Petitioner must also show that the disseminated
information was highly offensive to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). There is only an invasion of privacy
when publicity is given to information that a reasonable person would be
justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by the publicity. Id. at cmt. c.
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Whether the dissemination rises to the level of highly offensive is a question of law for the court to decide, taking into consideration "the context,
conduct, and circumstances surrounding the" disclosure. See Chisholm,
3 F. Supp. at 941 (quoting Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 254
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
In the instant case, the context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding the disclosure all support the conclusion that the dissemination
of Petitioner's employment history is not highly offensive. The context in
which the information was disclosed was that of a prospective hiring situation, which is the reason Petitioner provided the information to EmployExpert. EmployExpert complied with its own privacy policies and
redacted all identifying information. (R. 3, 13). Petitioner is only "offended" because Simpson figured out that she was looking for another
job. If Petitioner believes that any of her employment history or college
information is too personal to be released, she should not have included
it in her resume. Once Petitioner decided that each piece of listed information was relevant and could help her find new employment, she had
no basis to be "seriously aggrieved" when employers actually viewed this
information.
D.

THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE WEB SITE IS OF LEGITIMATE
CONCERN TO THE HIRING PUBLIC.

Petitioner must prove that the disseminated information is not of
legitimate public concern. "[T]he public has a proper interest in learning
about many matters." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d
(1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that individuals have an interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters. Whalen v.Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599 (1977). However, the public's interest in disclosure is often
balanced against an individual's privacy interest. See Klein Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 1987).
In Klein, a teacher claimed her privacy was invaded when the school
district was required to disclose her college transcript to fulfill an open
records act request. Id. at 577 (citing Texas Open Records Act, TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1986)). The court found that
there was no invasion because the balancing favored the public having
full and complete information about school teachers, especially given the
lack of competency prevalent in the state at the time. Id. at 581. Even
though the statute included a provision that exempted from disclosure
any personnel files that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, the court found that the college transcript did not rise to that
level. Id.
Similarly, in the instant case, the hiring public's interest is higher
than an individual's privacy interest in employment history information.
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An employer needs to be adequately informed of a prospective employee's
experience and skills before even considering whether or not to hire that
individual. Petitioner included her employment and educational history
in order to convey to hiring employers her extensive sales management
experience. (R. 11-13). If Petitioner did not believe that employers
would be interested in employment or educational information, she
would not have included it as a part of her online resume. Therefore,
EmployExpert did not violate Petitioner's privacy because it disseminated information of legitimate concern to the employing public.
EmployExpert clearly did not invade Petitioner's right to privacy.
EmployExpert merely disseminated Petitioner's non-identifying information that she provided on the Internet by making it available to employers searching for employees. Furthermore, EmployExpert limited
the profile viewing audience by using a login policy in efforts to protect
user privacy. The viewed information was not highly offensive to a reasonable person because if the employment and educational information
that Petitioner knew would be available to an Internet audience was so
private, she would not have included it on her resume. Finally, employment and educational histories are of legitimate public concern because
employers must know this information before they are able to hire qualified and competent employees.
Summary judgment is appropriate because as a matter of law, Petitioner is unable to prove the elements required to show public disclosure
of private facts. Therefore, this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment affirmed by the First District Court of Appeals in favor of
EmployExpert.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT
EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT INVADE PETITIONER'S
PRIVACY BY USING COOKIE TECHNOLOGY
TO TRACK HER NET SURFING ACTIVITY.

This Court should find that EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy by using cookie technology' to track her net surfing activity2 on the Internet. The State of Marshall recognizes the tort of
invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion as set forth in the Re1. EmployExpert used cookie technology (cookies) to monitor the Internet sites that
Petitioner visited. Cookies are small pieces of a text file placed on the user's computer hard
drive. See Internet Cookies, Charles Kessler & Assoc., at http://net-market.com/cookie.htm
(last modified Mar. 18, 1997). A Web site server may use cookies to track what Web sites
the user visited and how often the Web sites were visited. See The Unofficial Cookie FAQ,
Cookie Central, at http://www.Cookiescentral.com/faq (last visited Sept. 10, 2000).
2. Net surfing refers to a user's navigation from one site to the next on the Internet by
either clicking a computer mouse on a sites' links or typing in the address of the known
site. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
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statement § 652B. (R. 9). To hold EmployExpert liable for intrusion
upon seclusion, Petitioner must prove that she has a privacy interest in
surfing the Internet, there was an intrusion into her seclusion or solitude, and the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Because Petitioner
cannot prove all the elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort and it
is highly unlikely that Petitioner will be able to produce additional facts
that would create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, the Court
should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals by holding that EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy.
A.

EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT INVADE PETITIONER'S PRIVACY BECAUSE SHE
DOES NOT HAVE A PRIVACY INTEREST IN HER
NET SURFING ACTIVITY.

Petitioner cannot prove that EmployExpert invaded her privacy
under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion by tracking the sites she visited on the Internet since Petitioner does not have a privacy interest in
her net surfing activity. There is no law or regulation that recognizes net
surfing activity as a private interest that warrants protection. See generally Debra A. Valentine, Privacy on the Internet: The Evolving Legal
Landscape, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 401, 404-405
(2000). To have a valid cause of action, Petitioner must prove that her
net surfing activity was private. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B (1977).
1.

Petitioner'snet surfing activity is not included in the protected zone
of privacy established by the Supreme Court.

EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy because Petitioner's net surfing activity does not fall within the zone of privacy. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of Rights to protect the "right of
personal privacy, or [ ] guarantee [that] certain areas or zones of privacy
[do] exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). The zone of privacy protects two separate personal interests: (1)
the right to make fundamental decisions, and (2) the right to avoid disclosure of personal matters. See Valentine, supra, at 403-04. Petitioner's net surfing activity does not fall into either of the two personal
interest categories protected within the zone of privacy. Therefore, this
Court should affirm the court of appeal's order granting summary
judgment.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court recognized that an individual has the right to make certain fundamental decisions without intrusion. For example, the Supreme Court recognized that an individual has
a privacy interest in making decisions regarding procreation. See Roe,
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410 U.S. at 153; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972);
see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Additionally,
the right to decide who to marry is also a fundamental decision. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). Furthermore, individuals have privacy interests in educating and rearing their children. See Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925).
Unlike the category of interests our forefathers sought to protect in
the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, Petitioner's net surfing activity is
not a fundamental interest that is at the core of our existence as independent beings. As noted by the Supreme Court, the zone of privacy was
intended to safeguard fundamental constitutional interests such as marriage, procreation, contraception, and child-rearing. In fact, the Supreme
Court noted that only rights or interests that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" should be protected in the zone of privacy.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (quoting Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). Petitioner's net surfing activity is not deeply rooted in American tradition. Petitioner cannot reasonably equate her right to surf the net to an individual's right to make
life altering decisions.
In addition to protecting fundamental constitutional rights, the zone
of privacy also protects private information from being disclosed. See
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602-03. In Whalen, the Supreme Court first addressed the right of information privacy which allows individuals to keep
certain matters private because of the stigma and harassment that
would come with public knowledge. Id. Lower courts have adopted the
Supreme Court's holding. For example, in Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Hughes, the court noted that the positive HIV test result of a blood donor
should be kept private so the donor could avoid public stigma. 734
S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Even though the Supreme Court extended the zone of privacy to include the right of information privacy, Petitioner's net surfing activity
still would not be protected since it revealed non-personal information.
Although Simpson was able to identify her, he did not recognize her profile solely on the information found in the Interests section. The Supreme Court intended the right of information privacy to protect
humiliating information from being disclosed to the public. See Whalen,
429 U.S. at 602-03. The information revealed in the Interests section of
Petitioner's electronic resume would not cause her any humiliation or
embarrassment. (R. app. B). Therefore, the zone of privacy does not extend to cover Petitioner's net surfing activity.
Petitioner fails to realize that some activities we perform have no
privacy rights attached to them. For instance, by tracking a person's
credit card purchases, one can determine not only the person's buying
habits, but also their name, address, and telephone number. This infor-
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mation can be sold to companies who target credit card owners with catalogs and other advertisements that can be lawfully sold. See Dwyer v.
Am. Express, 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). In contrast,
EmployExpert only collected non-personal information that could not
solely identify Petitioner. (R. app. B). EmployExpert only disclosed the
type of sites Petitioner visited but did not disclose what Petitioner did on
those sites. If courts have found that an individual has no privacy right
in their name and address, then this Court should find that Petitioner
has no privacy rights in the information generated from net surfing because it is even less identifying than names and addresses.
Petitioner is asking this Court to expand the zone of privacy. The
Supreme Court refused to extend the zone of privacy to encompass the
right to commit suicide. If the Supreme Court failed to extend the zone
of privacy to include such a personal event as suicide, then this Court
should not extend the zone of privacy to encompass the non-personal activity of net surfing. See Washington, 521 U.S. at 728. A contrary holding would abrogate the purpose behind the zone of privacy doctrine;
which is to protect fundamental and personal rights.
2.

Petitioner'snet surfing activity is not private because the activity
was performed in a public forum.

Petitioner's net surfing activity is not private because it was performed on the Internet, which is open to the public. The Internet has
emerged as the "information superhighway" of the future and it is used
as a forum to exchange ideas and thoughts. See Morantz, Inc. v. Hang &
Shine Ultrasonics,Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1999). On the
Internet, "any person. . . can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox." Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. As
with any traditional public forum, an individual has no privacy interests
in activities conducted in public. See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970).
Because the Internet is a public forum, Petitioner's net surfing activity is not private. Petitioner's movement on the Internet is analogous to
our movements in life. Each day we leave behind a trail of where we've
been. A casual observer can identify who we speak to, what newspaper
we read, and what books we buy because these activities are done in
public. See generally Daniel P. Dern, Footprints and Fingerprints in
Cyberspace: The Trail You Leave Behind, Online Inc., at http:fl
www.onlineinc.com/onlinemag/JulOL97/Dern7.html (last visited Sept.
10, 2000). There is no protection for these activities because they can be
observed by the general public. See Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770-71.
Interestingly, "there [is no] liability for observing [a person or] taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway." RESTATE-
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(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). Likewise, the Internet is
the public highway of the future. Therefore, EmployExpert should not
be liable for intrusion upon seclusion since it only observed the path Petitioner followed while on the Internet. These observations are similar to
the general observations an individual would make in public.
MENT

B.

EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT INTRUDE UPON PETITIONER'S SECLUSION
BECAUSE EMPLOYEXPERT DID NOT ILLEGALLY OR SECRETLY
MONITOR PETITIONER'S NET SURFING ACTIVITY.

Even if this Court finds that Petitioner has a privacy interest in her
net surfing activity, EmployExpert cannot be liable for intrusion upon
seclusion because there was no intrusion into Petitioner's solitude. The
intrusion element of this tort is satisfied when the actor "believes, or is
substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act." O'Donnell v. United States, 891
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989). EmployExpert did not employ illegal or
questionable means to monitor Petitioner's net surfing activity. In fact,
Petitioner voluntarily agreed to have EmployExpert track her Internet
usage. (R. app. A). To assert a valid claim for intrusion upon seclusion,
Petitioner must establish that EmployExpert intentionally used cookie
technology for the purpose of interfering with her solitude. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Petitioner's claim should fail
because EmployExpert used cookie technology, with the Petitioner's permission, to gain limited information about Petitioner's use of the Internet. (R. app. B).
An intrusive action must be conducted in a deceptive or secretive
manner. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). A
valid claim for intrusion upon seclusion existed when an individual used
a forged court order to gain access to another's bank records. Id. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the defendant's intrusion must go beyond the limits of decency for liability to accrue to the
defendant. See Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co., 971 F.2d 492, 496-97
(10th Cir. 1992). Likewise, a Missouri appellate court found that a valid
intrusion upon seclusion claim existed because the defendant obtained
plaintiffs telephone bill by deception. See Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). The defendant opened
a sealed enveloped addressed to the plaintiff and read the contents. Id.
The court determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that the defendant intruded into plaintiffs solitude. Id.
Additionally, an intrusion claim is valid when the defendant obtained information illegally. See Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d
792, 796 (Me. 1976). In Berthiaume, the defendant entered the plaintiff s
hospital room and took the patient's photograph over his objections. Id.
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at 793. The court reasoned that because the defendant did not lawfully
enter the plaintiffs hospital room, a jury could conclude that there was
an intrusion. Id. At 796.
Moreover, plaintiffs have a valid invasion of privacy claim when a
defendant secretly intrudes into the plaintiffs' solitude. See Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). A pastor gained admittance into plaintiffs' home under the guise of counseling them. Id.
He later disclosed confidential information obtained from plaintiffs during those counseling sessions. Id. at 563. The court concluded that there
were sufficient facts in the pleadings for a jury to decide that defendant
intruded into plaintiffs' solitude. Id. At 563-64; see also Hamberger v.
Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964)(holding that a landlord intruded into his tenants' privacy by illegally installing and concealing listening and recording devices in his tenants' bedroom).
On the other hand, courts have granted motions to dismiss in actions were there were no facts sufficient for the jury to find that there
was an intrusion into plaintiffs solitude. See Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1356.
In Dwyer, cardholders brought an invasion of privacy claim against
American Express because it categorized each card holder's spending behavior and then rented this information along with the card holder's
name and address to merchants. Id. at 1353. The merchants then
targeted advertisements to the card holders. Id. The court held that
there was not an intrusion into the card holder's privacy because the
plaintiff voluntarily used the cards and American Express rented the information it compiled from its own records. Id. at 1356; see also Shibley
v. Times, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
a magazine publisher does not violate a subscriber's right of privacy by
selling and renting a subscriber's name and address to direct mail advertisers since the publisher gathered the information from its records).
In the instant case, EmployExpert did not intentionally intrude into
Petitioner's solitude. As opposed to the actions of the defendants in Corcoran, Berthiaume, and Hester, EmployExpert did not use secret or illegal actions to gain information from Petitioner. EmployExpert disclosed
that cookie technology would be used to collect information to create the
Interests section of her electronic resume and Petitioner voluntarily submitted her resume to EmployExpert. Additionally, EmployExpert did
not have deceptive motives to use cookie technology because the information was not going to be used for their benefit.
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EMPLOYEXPERT'S USE OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT HIGHLY
OFFENSIVE BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS AWARE THAT COOKIE
TECHNOLOGY WAS BEING USED AND SHE COULD HAVE
DEACTIVATED THE COOKIE TECHNOLOGY
AT ANY TIME.

Petitioner must also prove that EmployExpert's use of Internet technology to gather the information found in the Interests section of her
electronic resume was highly offensive to a reasonable person. In determining the offensiveness of the intrusion, this Court should consider the
degree of the intrusion, and the context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding the intrusion. Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); see also Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994). Additionally, an objective standard is used to determine whether the means
of intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See Frye v.
IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1042 (D. Kan. 1998).
"[Some intrusions into one's private sphere are inevitable.., in an
industrial and densely populated society [and] the law does not seek to
proscribe [these intrusions] even if it were possible to do so." Nader, 255
N.E.2d at 768. Plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to show that as
a result of the intrusion, a reasonable person would be outraged and humiliated or experience mental suffering as a result of the intrusion. An
objective standard is used to determine whether an intrusion is highly
offensive. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 680. In NBC, the court found that it
was possible for a jury to conclude that taking footage of a dying man "at
a time of vulnerability and confusion [was] 'highly offensive' conduct."
Id. At 679.
The court's holding in NBC is in accordance with the Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977). Comment d
states that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is committed when the
intrusion was so substantial as to offend a reasonable person. Id. To be
highly offensive behavior, a person's actions must be more than an inconvenient nuisance. See id.
In the instant case, a reasonable person considering the content of
the information revealed in the Interests section of Petitioner's resume
and the circumstances surrounding EmployExpert's obtaining the information would not find EmployExpert's actions highly offensive. Petitioner did not allege that she suffered emotional distress or anguish over
the display of the information. Moreover, if Petitioner was outraged by
the use of cookie technology, then at any time, she could have stopped
EmployExpert from using cookies to analyze her net surfing activity by
changing her privacy preference. (R. app. A).
Additionally, Restatement § 652B seeks to prevent relief for the allegations that Petitioner asserts. The Restatement uses an objective stan-

284

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIX

dard to determine if the intrusion was highly offensive. Id. This Court
should not grant relief to Petitioner because she has a sensitive disposition and is easily offended. A reasonable person would not be offended
by the use of cookie technology if they are aware of its use and could
deactivate the cookies at anytime.
D.

PETITIONER CANNOT MAINTAIN A VALID CLAIM FOR INTRUSION UPON
SECLUSION BECAUSE PETITIONER CONSENTED TO

EMPLOYEXPERT'S USE OF COOKIE TECHNOLOGY TO
MONITOR THE SITES SHE VISITED.

Even if this Court finds that Petitioner alleged facts sufficient for a
valid invasion of privacy claim under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion,
summary judgment should be entered against the Petitioner because she
consented to EmployExpert's monitoring of her net surfing activity. Because intrusion upon seclusion is an intentional tort, Petitioner's consent
is an absolute defense. Baugh v.CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). Petitioner consented by clicking onto an icon marked "I
agree" to allow EmployExpert to use cookie technology to add information to the Interests section of her resume. (R. app. A). Additionally, by
consenting to have EmployExpert monitor her net surfing activity, Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
1.

Petitionerconsented to EmployExpert monitoring her net surfing
activity.

Courts have upheld Internet agreements entered into by clicking the
"I agree" button next to the relevant terms. Caspi v. Microsoft Network,
L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). A perspective
subscriber had a valid membership agreement with Microsoft Network
and the agreement was enforceable because the subscriber clicked "I
agree" next to the terms of the membership agreement. Id. at 530; see
also CompuServ, Inc. v.Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260, 65 (6th Cir.
1996)(holding that a software distributor assented to the terms of the
agreement by typing "I agree" at various points of the electronic contract); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10729 *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)(holding that Hotmail
could enforce an agreement that curtailed spam e-mailing because the
user clicked his acceptance of the terms). Likewise, this Court should
hold that there was a valid agreement between Petitioner and EmployExpert because Petitioner consented to the use of cookie technology
by leaving both boxes checked next to the "I agree" icon.
Additionally, this Court should not waive Petitioner's consent on the
basis of Petitioner's assertion that she did not understand the term
cookie technology. Petitioner is a sophisticated Internet user and should
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not be able to plead ignorance of her knowledge when it is convenient for
her to do so. Petitioner spends several hours per day navigating her way
through the Internet to find information about the weather, sports, and
other topics of interest. (R. app. B). With a few mouse clicks, Petitioner
could easily have determined what cookies are and what information
they collect. See generally Cookie, Webopedia, at <http://webopedia.inter
net.com/TERMlc/cookie.html> (last modified Mar. 18, 1997) (providing
links to various information sites on cookies); see also Internet Cookies,
Charles Kessler & Assoc., at http://net-market.com/cookie.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2000).
There are several cases that stand for the proposition that a plaintiff
cannot assert a valid claim for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion if consent was given to perform the intrusive activity. See Doe v. Dyer-Goode,
566 A.2d 889, 891-92 (Pa. 1989); see also Curtrightv. Ray, No. 90-2034V, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12429, at *19-20 (D. Kan. 1991). Similarly,
this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of EmployExpert because the Petitioner consented to the use of cookie
technology.
2.

Petitionerhad no reasonableexpectation of privacy.

Since Petitioner consented to have her net surfing activity monitored, Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy. "[Elven extraordinary offensive conduct may not be redressed via the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion unless a plaintiff demonstrates a legitimate expectation of privacy." Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc.,
220 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621
F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed an employee's claim for intrusion upon seclusion because he had
no reasonable expectation of privacy since he was aware that his employer had a policy of monitoring the Internet sites he visited. United
States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2000). Moreover, a federal
district court held that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was aware that the conversation was being
recorded and other persons could overhear his conversation. Kemp v.
Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985). Similarly this Court
should find that Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy because Petitioner was aware that her net surfing activity was being monitored by EmployExpert and consented to the monitoring.
Petitioner cannot prove all the elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort and it is highly unlikely that Petitioner will be able to produce
additional facts to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Petitioner has no privacy interest in her net surfing activity because net
surfing is not protected within the zone of privacy and the activity was
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performed in a forum that is open to the public. Even if this Court finds
that Petitioner alleged sufficient facts to maintain a valid intrusion upon
seclusion action, EmployExpert has a complete defense to Petitioner's
claim because she consented to the monitoring of her surfing activity.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the court of appeals by holding that
EmployExpert did not invade Petitioner's privacy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent, EmployExpert.com, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the First District Court of Appeals'
grant of summary judgment on both invasion of privacy issues.
Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX D

§ 652D (1977)
PUBLICITY GIVEN TO PRIVATE LIFE
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that:
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS

Comment:
a. Publicity. The form of invasion of the right of privacy covered in
this Section depends upon publicity given to the private life of the individual. "Publicity," as it is used in this Section, differs from "publication," as that term is used in § 577 in connection with liability for
defamation. "Publication," in that sense, is a word of art, which includes
any communication by the defendant to a third person. "Publicity," on
the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be
oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication that
reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.
Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule
stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiffs
private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the
other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small
circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or
any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large
audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as
it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between
private and public communication.
b. Privatelife. The rule stated in this Section applies only to publicity given to matters concerning the private, as distinguished from the
public, life of the individual. There is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is
already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts
about the plaintiffs life that are matters of public record, such as the
date of his birth, the fact of his marriage, his military record, the fact
that he is admitted to the practice of medicine or is licensed to drive a
taxicab, or the pleadings that he has filed in a lawsuit. On the other
hand, if the record is one not open to public inspection, as in the case of
income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an invasion of privacy
when it is made so.
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Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the
plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus, he normally cannot
complain when his photograph is taken while he is walking down the
public street and is published in the defendant's newspaper. Nor is his
privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity in which the plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public. On the
other hand, when a photograph is taken without the plaintiffs consent in
a private place, or one already made is stolen from his home, the plaintiffs appearance that is made public when the picture appears in a newspaper is still a private matter, and his privacy is invaded.
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and
some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but
keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close
friends. Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private
matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a
man's life in his home, and some of his past history that he would rather
forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man,
there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of
legitimate public interest.
c. Highly offensive publicity. The rule stated in this Section gives
protection only against unreasonable publicity of a kind highly offensive
to the ordinary reasonable man. The protection afforded to the plaintiffs
interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and
place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors
and fellow citizens. Complete privacy does not exist in this world except
in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the
ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part. Thus he
must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to
what he does, and that his comings and goings and his ordinary daily
activities, will be described in the press as a matter of casual interest to
others. The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at a report in
a newspaper that he has returned from a visit, gone camping in the
woods or given a party at his house for his friends. Even minor and moderate annoyance, as for example through public disclosure of the fact
that the plaintiff has clumsily fallen downstairs and broken his ankle, is
not sufficient to give him a cause of action under the rule stated in this
Section. It is only when the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that
the cause of action arises.
d. Matter of legitimate public concern. When the matter to which
publicity is given is true, it is not enough that the publicity would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. The common law has long recog-
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nized that the public has a proper interest in learning about many matters. When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public
concern, there is no invasion of privacy.
This has now become a rule not just of the common law of torts, but
of the Federal Constitution as well. In the case of Cox BroadcastingCo.
v.Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, the Supreme Court indicated that an action
for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained when the subject-matter of
the publicity is a matter of "legitimate concern to the public." The Court
held specifically that the "States may not impose sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection." Other language indicates that this-position applies to
public records in general.
It seems clear that the common law restrictions on recovery for publicity given to a matter of proper public interest will now become a part of
the constitutional law of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. To
the extent that the constitutional definition of a matter that is of legitimate concern to the public is broader than the definition given in any
State, the constitutional definition will of course control. In the absence
of additional holdings of the Supreme Court, the succeeding Comments
are based on decisions at common law.
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APPENDIX E
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

TORTS § 652B (1977)

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Comment:
a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not
depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded
or to his affairs. It consists solely of an intentional interference with his
interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable man.
b. The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which
the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way
into the plaintiffs room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiffs objection
in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant's senses,
with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiffs
private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars
or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his
private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal documents. The intrusion itself makes
the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or
other use of any kind of the photograph or information outlined.
Illustrations:
1. A, a woman, is sick in a hospital with a rare disease that arouses
public curiosity. B, a newspaper reporter, calls her on the telephone and
asks for an interview, but she refuses to see him. B then goes to the
hospital, enters A's room and over her objection takes her photograph. B
has invaded A's privacy.
2. A, a private detective seeking evidence for use in a lawsuit, rents
a room in a house adjoining B's residence, and for two weeks looks into
the windows of B's upstairs bedroom through a telescope taking intimate
pictures with a telescopic lens. A has invaded B's privacy.
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that A taps B's telephone wires and installs a recording device to make a record of B's conversations. A has invaded B's privacy.
4. A is seeking evidence for use in a civil action he is bringing
against B. He goes to the bank in which B has his personal account,
exhibits a forged court order, and demands to be allowed to examine the

20001

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

bank's records of the account. The bank submits to the order and permits him to do so. A has invaded B's privacy.
5. A, a professional photographer, seeking to promote his business,
telephones B, a lady of social prominence, every day for a month, insisting that she come to his studio and be photographed. The calls are made
at meal times, late at night and at other inconvenient times, and A ignores B's requests to desist. A has invaded B's privacy.
c. The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this
Section only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise
invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. Thus there is no liability for the examination of a public
record concerning the plaintiff, or of documents that the plaintiff is required to keep and make available for public inspection. Nor is there
liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is
walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his
appearance is public and open to the public eye. Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there
may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these
matters.
Illustrations:
6. A is drunk on the public street. B takes his photograph in that
condition. B has not invaded A's privacy.
7. A, a young woman, attends a "Fun House," a public place of
amusement where various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is
there a concealed jet of compressed air blows her skirts over her head,
and reveals her underwear. B takes a photograph of her in that position.
B has invaded A's privacy.
d. There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the
plaintiffs seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly
offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to
which the reasonable man would strongly object. Thus there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiffs door, or calling him to the telephone on
one occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt. It is
only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and
frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.
Illustration:
8. A, a landlord, calls upon B, his tenant, at nine o'clock on Sunday
morning, to demand payment of the rent, although he knows that B is
not ready to pay it and that B objects to such a visit on Sunday. B is
seriously annoyed. This is not an invasion of B's privacy.
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